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The introduction of the instrument of Commitment Decisions (CDs) by Regulation 1/2003 
initiated what has been called a trend towards ‘consensual competition law’. 1  While 
‘consensual’ elements are no novelty – neither in public enforcement regimes in general, nor 
in public competition law in particular2 – it has only been within the last 10 years that 
‘consensual tools’ in form of CDs became a prime instrument for public competition law 
enforcement. This trend reflects not only in the practice of the EU Commission 
(Commission) but also of National Competition Authorities (NCAs). The year of the 10th 
anniversary of Regulation 1/2003 (applicable since 1st of May 2004) is a good occasion to 
analyse the merits, dangers, and limits of this trend. 
According to Art. 9 (1) Regulation 1/2003 the Commission can address competition concerns 
identified in a preliminary assessment by making commitments, which were offered by 
undertakings to address these concerns, legally binding. In this way the authority can 
conclude investigations without finding an infringement of competition law. Similarly, 
pursuant to Art. 5 Regulation 1/2003 NCAs may accept commitments of undertakings to 
close proceedings. In fact, nearly all Member States (MS) have introduced similar tools into 
their national enforcement systems.3 
The instrument of CDs is subject to controversy since its introduction in 2004.4 This debate 
revolves around fundamental issues, such as the question of the right balance between 
procedural efficiency and effectiveness or, put differently, the balance between the aim of a 
quick and inexpensive solution of competition concerns on the one hand, and aims such as 
deterrence and precedent value on the other; the rule of law and its effects on the margin of 
                                                
1 Florian Wagner-von Papp, Best and Even Better Practices in Commitment Procedures after Alrosa: The 
Dangers of Abandoning the "Struggle for Competition Law", Common Market Law Review, 49 vol., 2012, 
p. 966. 
2 See for informal understandings at Union level e.g. Commission, 1985, Fourteenth Report on Competition 
Policy (Published in conjunction with the 'Eighteenth General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities 1984'), at paras. 94, 95; Commission, 1988, Seventeenth Report on Competition Policy 
(Published in conjunction with the 'Twenty-first General Report on the Activities of the European 
Communities 1987'), at para. 81; Commission, 1998, XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy (1997) 
(Published in conjunction with the General Report on the Activities of the European Union - 1997), at para. 
67. 
3 Commission, 9 July 2014, Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2014) 230/2 – Ten Years of Antitrust 
Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, at para. 196. See for Germany Sec. 32b ARC and the UK Sec. 31A-
31E, Sched. 6A CA98. 
4 See with further reference Heike Schweitzer, Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States: 
Functions and risks of a new instrument of competition law enforcement in a federal enforcement regime, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101630 (accessed 01 September 2014), 2012, p. 3 fn. 13. 
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discretion of competition authorities when enforcing the law; the principle of separation of 
powers and the role of the courts and parliaments in developing and substantiating the 
substance of the competition rules; or the protection of fundamental rights of the 
undertakings concerned and of third parties. Nevertheless, it is striking that this vivid 
discussion is predominantly confined to the practice of the Commission and the Union 
Courts, while only little attention is given to the evolution of similar procedures and practices 
at national level. This is all the more surprising as this instrument was introduced by a 
regulation that aimed at ‘decentralising’ competition law enforcement within the European 
Union (EU).5 In fact, Regulation 1/2003 significantly changed the role of NCAs, which are 
now empowered to apply EU competition law (Art. 5), and led – with a view to the remaining 
strong position of the Commission as primus inter pares6 – at least to a ‘de-concentration’ of 
competition law enforcement in the EU. 
In the light of this gap, the trend towards ‘consensual competition law’ will be analysed from 
a comparative perspective that focuses on the developments in two MS that represent both the 
civil law and the common law tradition in the EU – Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Regulation 1/2003 allows for procedural autonomy and ‘experiments’ with different 
procedural designs at national level. The very rudimentary rule of Art. 5 does not fully 
harmonize procedures but rather facilitates procedural diversity amongst European 
competition enforcement regimes.7 Exploring not only the different procedural designs, but 
furthermore the different practices and policies of NCAs and national courts, may contribute 
to developing a deeper understanding of the functioning of the instrument, to raising 
awareness for the problems that emerge, and potentially even to finding innovative solutions 
that may be transplanted across jurisdictions. The Commission itself cherishes this approach 
with a view to the work of the European Competition Network (ECN): It stresses that 
“differences in procedures remain” but at the same time calls CDs “a prime example for 
procedural convergence based on inspiration from the EU model and the cross-fertilisation of 
ideas supported by multilateral cooperation”. 8  Hence, the MS as part of the federal 
                                                
5 Commission, 28 April 1999, White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of 
the EC Treaty, Commission Programm 99/027, OJ C 132/1 (1999), at paras. 82 et seq. 
6 E.g. pursuant to Art. 11 (6) Regulation 1/2003 the Commission can bring proceedings of NCAs to an end by 
opening its own proceedings against the same violation. On the remaining central powers of the Commission 
see also Giorgio Monti, Independence, Interdependence and Legitimacy: The EU Commission, National 
Competition Authorities, and the European Competition Network, EUI Working Papers, 2014, p. 17. 
7 Commission, 9 July 2014, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, at para. 200. 
8 Ibid., at para. 196. 
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enforcement system of the EU serve as ‘laboratories’:9 While EU competition law strongly 
influenced national legal orders in recent years, given the remaining differences with a view 
to the commitment procedures and policies, there may be much to learn for the EU itself from 
the more deeply-rooted legal traditions in the MS. 
The inquiry is structured the following way:  
It sets out by (briefly) recalling the limited level of ex post judicial control of CDs at Union 
level since the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) famous Alrosa-decision of 2010, and shows 
that while the situation at MS-level remains to date unclear, there are reasons to expect a 
stricter approach of national courts (B.). Nevertheless, given the reduced standard of judicial 
control established by the ECJ, it is argued that ex ante procedural control mechanisms and 
self-restraint of competition authorities are called for in order to protect individual rights, and 
to prevent jeopardizing the supremacy of the rule of law. 
Accordingly, the following section turns to procedural ex ante control mechanisms 
implemented in the commitment procedure, and asks in how far these mechanisms 
sufficiently substitute for full judicial control (C.). In order to devise a conceptual framework 
of what to expect from the commitment procedure, the instrument of CDs will be related to 
the two main other enforcement routes that competition authorities can potentially take in 
similar cases, namely: Informal Understandings (IUs) and formal unilateral Infringement 
Decisions (IDs). Against this background, procedural differences in Germany and the UK 
will be revealed and illustrated. The question then arises of why these differences exist and, 
on a more normative level, which procedural design corresponds more closely to the ‘ideal 
conception’ of the commitment procedure, and is better suited to substitute for the lack of full 
judicial control.  
Subsequently, the analysis turns to the application of the instrument by the NCAs in Germany 
and the UK (D.). It has been criticised that the Commission makes excessive use of the 
commitment procedure, and stretches competition law enforcement beyond its traditional 
limits.10 Against this background, the inquiry focuses on the practice of NCAs in Germany 
and the UK, and explores the amount of self-restraint to be found at the national level. 
                                                
9 See for this methodology and the origin of the metaphor of ‘states as laboratories’ Rob van Gestel, Hans-W. 
Micklitz, and Miguel Poiares Maduro, Methodology in the New Legal World, EUI Working Papers, 13 vol., 
2012, p. 16. 
10 See as an illustration for a recent example of this criticism Alex Barker, 'Brussels reaches legal limits on 
Google antitrust settlement', Financial Times, 21 July 2014. 
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Similarities and differences of the enforcement strategies applied by NCAs will be analysed. 
On a more normative level, these strategies will be evaluated in the light of the reduced 
standard of judicial control.  
The final chapter concludes and outlines questions that are left for future research (E.). 
  
 8 
B. Judicial Review of Commitment Decisions 
The Commission – as investigator, prosecutor, and decision maker – is at the centre of EU 
competition law enforcement. To counter the risk of prosecutorial biases and to protect 
individual rights, two instruments are in place: Ex-ante procedural guarantees and ex-post 
judicial control. These two instruments complement each other,11 and to a certain extend one 
can substitute shortcomings of the other.  
The question arises whether or not the system of checks-and-balances of EU competition law 
enforcement has struck the right balance. The principle of separation of powers demands that 
judicial review keeps in mind the need for some degree of policy discretion of competition 
authorities, or, put differently, “courts cannot become competition authorities”.12 On the other 
hand, Art. 17 (1) TEU clearly states that the Commission oversees the application of Union 
law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which pursuant 
to Art. 19 (1) TEU has to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the treaties the 
law is observed. By self-imposing significant restriction on judicial control of CDs, and thus 
granting discretion to the Commission when applying EU competition law, the ECJ may have 
gone too far lately. 
Judicial review of the Commission’s CDs is limited for two reasons: The standard of judicial 
review applied by the courts as well as the right to sue are reduced compared to IDs. The 
(comparatively) high standard of judicial control applied to the commitment procedure by the 
General Court (GC) in the Alrosa-Case in 200713 evoked hopeful reactions, especially of 
those that were generally concerned with a view to the protection of the rights of the 
undertakings concerned and third parties, as well as with the functioning of the instrument 
within the overall framework of competition law enforcement in the EU.14 These hopes were 
                                                
11 See e.g. on the requirements of Art. 6 (1) ECHR Heike Schweitzer, 'The European Competition Law 
Enforcement System and the Evolution of Judicial Review', in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis 
(eds.), European Competition Law Annual: 2009, The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in 
Competition Cases (Oxford 2011), p. 83: ”The European Court of Human Rights has thereby adopted what 
has been called a ‘composite approach’: administrative law enforcement need not be fully ‘judicialized’ in 
order to meet the requirements of Art. 6 (1) ECHR. But it must be governed by sufficiently strong 
procedural guarantees, and must be combined with an effective regime of judicial control with ‘full 
jurisdiction’ to review the administrative decision.” 
12 José Carlos Laguna de Paz, Understanding the limits of judicial review in European competition law, Journal 
of Antitrust Enforcement, 2013, p. 7 et seq.; see also Heike Schweitzer, The European Competition Law 
Enforcement System and the Evolution of Judicial Review, p. 146. 
13 GC, 11 July 2007, Case T-170/06, ECR 2007 II-2601 – Alrosa.  
14 See e.g. Heike Schweitzer, 'Commitment decisions under Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The developing EC 
practice and case law', in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds.), European Competition Law 
Annual 2008: antitrust Settlement under EC competition law (Oxford 2010), p. 562 et seq., 77; Torsten 
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crushed by the ECJ in 2010, which followed the opinion of Advocate General (AG) Kokott15 
when setting aside the decision of the GC and significantly lowering the standard of judicial 
control of CDs.16  
In a nutshell, the ECJ decided that as a consequence of the ‘voluntary nature’ of CDs the 
principle of proportionality applies only to a limited extend, as the Commission does not have 
to “seek out less onerous or more moderate solutions than the commitments offered to it” 
(para. 61), and the content of judicial control is reduced to review “whether the 
Commission’s assessment is manifestly incorrect” (para. 42). The question as to which 
parties are entitled to challenge CDs in front of the EU courts remains to a certain extend 
unclear. Arguably, however, undertakings involved do not have standing as they ‘voluntarily’ 
offer commitments,17 while third parties often lack the incentive to sue, especially in cases of 
Type-I errors (over-enforcement), where competitors are subject to onerous obligations.18 
                                                                                                                                                  
Körber, 'Rechtliches Gehör, Verpflichtungszusagen nach Art. 9 VO 1/2003 und die Alrosa-Entscheidung', in 
Wolfgang Weiß (ed.), Die Rechtsstellung Betroffener im modernisierten EU-Kartellverfahren, Vorträge des 
1. Speyerer Kartellrechtsforums (Baden-Baden 2010), p. 91. 
15 AG Kokott, 17 September 2009, Case C-441/07 P, ECR 2010 I-5949 – Alrosa. 
16 ECJ, 29 June 2010, Case C-441/07 P, ECR 2010 I-5949 – Alrosa. For a discussion of the judgement see only 
Florian Wagner-von Papp, CML Rev. (2012), p. 929 et seq.; Heike Schweitzer, 'Verpflichtungszusagen im 
Gemeinschaftsrecht', in Stefan Bechtold, Joachim Jickeli, and Mathias Rohe (eds.), Recht, Ordnung und 
Wettbewerb. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel (Baden-Baden 2011), p. 640 et seq. 
17 Parties that offered commitments are, as addressees of the commitment decision, adversely affected in their 
legal position and therefore generally meet the requests of the right to sue pursuant to Art. 263 para. 4 
TFEU. However, arguably the voluntary nature of the commitments precludes the possibility of appealing 
the decision, as this would contradict their previous behaviour (venire contra factum proprium). The 
voluntary offer of commitments may be interpreted as a waiver of future appeals – excluding only 
exceptional cases involving e.g. coercion or deception. Heike Schweitzer, (2012), Commitment Decisions in 
the EU and in the Member States, p. 18, pointing also to ECJ, 29 June 2010, Case C-441/07 P, ECR 2010 I-
5949 – Alrosa, at para. 48, where the court underlines that the undertaking concerned consciously accepts 
certain disadvantages in exchange for certain benefits, when offering commitments. 
18 Affected third parties can bring proceedings against CDs. Pursuant to Art. 263 (4) TFEU they can initiate an 
annulment proceeding, provided that they can show that the decisions is of “direct and individual concern” 
to them. A question in this context that has yet not been clarified is whether or not this requirement is met, 
when third parties participated in the ‘market test’. This has been argued with a view to the former situation 
under Art. 19 (3) Regulation 17/62 by Thomas Tobias Henning, Settlements im Europäischen 
Kartellverfahren, Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung konsensualer 
Verfahrensbeendigungsmechanismen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der 
Verpflichtungszusageentscheidung, eds. Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Wernhard Möschel, and Martin 
Hellwig (Wirtschaftsrecht und Wirtschaftspolitik, Baden-Baden, 2010), p. 370. In Alrosa the right to sue 
followed already from the level of participation of Alrosa in the proceedings, and the fact that De Beers 
offered to terminate all sales relations with Alrosa, see GC, 11 July 2007, Case T-170/06, ECR 2007 II-2601 
– Alrosa, at paras. 36 et seq. In cases of over-enforcement third parties will have the right and the incentive 
to sue only in very exceptional cases (e.g. the Alrosa-Case), where the burdensome measure imposed on 
competitors has negative impact on their business practice as well. The same view takes Florian Wagner-von 
Papp, CML Rev. (2012), p. 968. 
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The scope of judicial review of CDs in Germany and the UK has not yet been further 
clarified. Nevertheless, while the situation concerning the right to sue in front of the national 
courts is similar to the one at Union level, chances are that the national courts will not grant 
competition authorities the same level of discretion as the ECJ, but will apply a stricter 
standard of judicial control.19 
With a view to the right to sue, in Germany and the UK it has to be distinguished between the 
undertakings concerned and third parties: The undertakings concerned can generally not 
challenge CDs, while third parties generally have standing as long as they are ‘significantly 
affected’ by the decision.20 Thus, the situation in the MS resembles the setting at Union level. 
On the contrary, while the standard of judicial review applied by the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (CAT) to CDs is reduced compared to the one applied to IDs, it (nevertheless) 
appears to be higher compared to the standard of the ECJ: It is one of the distinct 
characteristics of judicial control of UK competition law that the CAT reviews IDs ‘on the 
merits’, which is to say that the CAT can assume the role of a primary decision-maker by 
replacing the decision of the competition authority with its own judgment. On the contrary, 
however, CDs are subject to “judicial review principles”, which is to say that only the 
procedure and the plausibility of the decision are being reviewed, while the tribunal cannot 
replace the decision as such (sched. 8 (3), (3A) CA98).21 Hence, the competences of the CAT 
                                                
19 The national legislators implemented Art. 5 Regulation 1/2003, when introducing the instrument of CDs into 
national law. It is well recognized and established by case law that national transposition law has to be 
interpreted in line with Union law (Werner Schroeder, 'Art. 288 AEUV', in Rudolf Streinz (ed.), 
EUV/AEUV (München 2012), at paras. 125 et seq.). However, Art. 5 leaves a very broad margin of 
discretion to national legislators. Therefore, arguably, there is room for implementing a varying degree of 
judicial control of CDs as well. The ECJ’s Alrosa-judgement does not necessarily have to be followed by 
national legislators or courts but there is room for higher standards of judicial review in the MS. 
20 In the UK the undertakings concerned can only challenge the decision refusing the request to release 
commitments, as well as the decision to release commitments because the authority believes that the 
competition concerns no longer arise (Sec. 46 (3) lit. g, h CA98). Third parties that have a “sufficient interest 
in the decision” can additionally demand to have the decision to accept commitments or a (material) 
variation of commitments reviewed (Sec. 47 (1) lit. b, c, (2) CA98; see also the OFT, 2004, Enforcement, 
Incorporating the Office of Fair Trading’s guidance as to the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to 
accept commitments (hereinafter Enforcement Guidance), at paras. 4.25, 4.26). However, a further definition 
of “sufficiently interested” is missing. Similarily, in Germany undertakings concerned will not enjoy 
standing, except under very special circumstances. Other parties have to be summoned to the proceeding 
(Sec. 63 (2) ARC) or the request to be summoned must have been rejected for reasons of procedural 
economy, in order to enjoy standing. Only parties whose interests are “significantly affected” can make such 
a request (Sec. 54 (2) ARC). The parties have to show that they are factually or legally affected by the 
decision. They cannot challenge the decision merely on the ground that the authority should have issued an 
infringement decision. See for more details Joachim Bornkamm, '§ 32b GWB', in Hermann-Josef Bunte 
(ed.), Langen/Bunte Kartellrecht, Kommentar (12 edn., 1 vol., Cologne 2014), at paras. 37 et seq. 
21 For more details see Heike Schweitzer, The European Competition Law Enforcement System and the 
Evolution of Judicial Review, p. 123. 
 11 
in reviewing CDs are reduced compared to the control of IDs. Yet, compared to judicial 
review at Union level – where courts have no jurisdiction on the merits anyway (see the 
limited grounds for action in Art. 263 TFEU)22 – the standard in the UK seems in fact to still 
be higher. Pursuant to sched. 8 (3A) CA98 when reviewing CDs the CAT has to apply “the 
same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review”.23 
Arguably, this precludes the application of a reduced standard of the principle of 
proportionality as established by the ECJ in Alrosa. 
In Germany, the standard of judicial review of CDs remains unclear. Nevertheless, CDs 
might well be subject to a higher level of judicial control compared to the one applied at 
Union level: In Germany, traditionally, competition rules are perceived as fully legal and 
non-political in nature. Therefore, judicial review is generally strong and does not recognize 
margins of appreciation or discretionary elements beyond judicial control.24 Accepting a wide 
margin of discretion outside the scope of judicial review in commitment procedures would 
not fit into this legal tradition. 
In sum, while in the light of the principle of separation of powers the competences of courts 
to control the work of competition authorities has to be limited, the self-restraint of judicial 
control established by the ECJ in Alrosa appears to be excessive. Chances are that national 
courts in Germany and the UK will not follow this approach but apply a stricter standard, 
aiming at securing the legal, non-political nature of competition law. To date, however, the 
situation in the MS remains unclear. In practice, so-far CDs have not been subject to (strict) 
judicial control by national courts. 
The (potential) limitation of judicial control of CDs raises fundamental concerns:25 While the 
conclusion that undertakings that offer commitments have to live with the consequences is 
acceptable – provided that they make a free and informed decision – the ‘voluntary nature’ is 
                                                
22 Ibid., at 90, 91. 
23 See also the OFT, 2004, Enforcement Guidance, at para. 4.26. The CAT may dismiss the application for 
review or quash the whole or part of the commitments decision to which it relates; and where it quashes the 
whole or part of that decision, refer the matter back to the OFT with a direction to reconsider and make a 
new decision in accordance with the ruling of the CAT. 
24 Heike Schweitzer, The European Competition Law Enforcement System and the Evolution of Judicial 
Review, p. 118. 
25 For a more detailed discussion see Florian Wagner-von Papp, CML Rev. (2012), p. 937 et seq.; Heike 
Schweitzer, Verpflichtungszusagen im Gemeinschaftsrecht, p. 646 et seq.; Firat Cengiz, Judicial Review 
And The Rule Of Law In The EU Competition Law Regime After Alrosa, European Competition Journal, 7 
vol., 1 iss., 2011, p. 135 et seq., 149 et seq.; Manuel Kellerbauer, Playground instead of playpen: The Court 
of Justice of the European Union's Alrosa judgement on art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003, European Competition 
Law Review, 1 iss., 2011, p. 1-8. 
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no appropriate safeguard against negative externalities of excessive commitments. The 
economic rational of the undertakings concerned does not necessarily match the public 
interest in a system of undistorted competition.26 The protection of the interests of third 
parties remains questionable, when the standard of the principle of proportionality is severely 
lowered. Even though the interests of third parties have to be taken into account pursuant to 
the Alrosa-decision (para. 41), it is difficult to assess, let alone account for the externalities of 
(excessive or unsuitable) commitments on competition, especially in situations of factual or 
legal uncertainties. While procedural economy might justify negative externalities in some 
special cases, the prevalence of the rule of law is endangered when big parts of competition 
law are subject to limited (or no) judicial control – as is the case when CDs become the prime 
enforcement tool. Moreover, when the courts do not clarify important novel legal questions, 
legal uncertainty rises and the development of legal doctrine is hampered. The deterrent 
effect and the function of competition law as guiding rules for undertakings in the market are 
endangered.  
As the administrative enforcement system is subject to a dual control mechanism – ex-post 
judicial control and ex-ante procedural safeguards – a reduced level of one mechanism might 
be acceptable as long as it is compensated by a strong design of the other. Therefore, the 
question arises in how far the safeguards established in the commitment procedures in 
Germany and the UK compensate for the – in case of the MS potentially – reduced level of 
judicial control. 
  
                                                
26 Heike Schweitzer, Verpflichtungszusagen im Gemeinschaftsrecht, p. 647. In order to avoid long and costly 
proceedings, high fines or bad reputation undertakings may be willing to accept far-reaching commitments. 
The interests of the undertakings concerned may become aligned with the potentially biased interests of the 
Commission, even if the authority seeks remedies that are themselves anticompetitive. Therefore, to the 
detriment of the interests of third parties and the public interest in a system of undistorted competition, the 
Commission might be a less reliable agent for their interests in the commitment procedure compared to the 
infringement procedure, Florian Wagner-von Papp, CML Rev. (2012), p. 951. 
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C. Commitment Procedures in Germany and the UK 
This section compares the design of the commitment procedure in Germany and the UK. The 
aim of this inquiry is to uncover similarities and differences, and to find out why potential 
differences exist. The analysis further discusses advantages and disadvantages of the legal 
frameworks with a view to substituting the (potentially) limited standard of (ex post) judicial 
control of CDs. In how far are sufficient safeguards in place to ensure the application of the 
rule of law in competition law enforcement; and to protect the rights of the undertakings 
concerned, third parties and the public interest in the protection of a system of undistorted 
competition? Moreover, the question arises to what extend (ex ante) procedural requirements 
adequately restrict the ability of competition authorities to make ‘instrumental’27 use of 
competition law. 
Before analysing in detail the different designs of the most important elements of the 
commitment procedure – namely the Scope of Application (II.), the Negotiation Process 
(III.), the Preliminary Assessment of the Competition Concerns (IV.), the Content of the 
Commitments (V.), the Involvement of Third Parties (VI.), the Implementation and 
Enforcement of the Decision (VII.), and the Reopening of the Procedure (VIII.) – this section 
starts by conceptualising the relationship of the instrument of CDs with informal 
understandings on the one hand, and the formal infringement procedure on the other hand, in 
order to device in more general terms what to expect from the commitment procedure (I.).  
I. What to Expect from the Commitment Procedure – Conceptualizing the 
Relationship to Informal Understandings and Infringement Procedures 
Competition authorities have basically three options to terminate competition law 
proceedings, and to change the conduct, or even the structure of the undertakings concerned: 
Reaching an informal understanding, making commitments offered by the undertakings 
concerned binding, or issuing a unilateral ID (1.). With a view to the parameters of (a) 
procedural efficiency and (b) the accuracy of the standard of competition law intervention, 
conceptually out of the three enforcement tools CDs should be the most balanced instrument 
(2.). 
                                                
27 For a definition see infra C.I.2. 
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1. The Coexistence of Enforcement Tools in Practice 
While the coexistence of the commitment and the infringement procedure is uncontested, it is 
questionable in how far IUs were replaced by the commitment procedure. The language of 
the DG Competition’s Antitrust Manual of Procedures and one of its more recent policy 
briefs suggest that IUs are not practised under Regulations 1/2003.28 Arguably, the procedural 
specifications of the instrument of CDs must not be undermined by an informal ‘settlement 
procedure’. On the other hand, there is no statutory rule that indicates that the commitment 
procedure replaces other forms of informal competition law enforcement. Accordingly, some 
commentators perceive these informal settlements as a legitimate alternative to the 
commitment procedure.29 In practice the Commission still engages in IUs.30 The same is true 
for the NCAs in Germany31 and the UK32. Hence, in practice IUs and the commitment 
procedure coexist.  
                                                
28 DG Competition, 2012, Antitrust Manual of Proceedings, Internal DG Competition working documents on the 
procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, at mod. 16 paras. 6: "[…] 'informal settlemens' 
(such as practised before Regulation 1/2003 came into force) […]"; DG Competition, March 2014, 
Competition policy brief, To commit or not to commit? Deciding between prohibition and commitments, p. 
2: "They [Commitment Decisions] have replaced the practice of informally closing cases based on voluntary, 
non-binding commitments which did not provide for any kind of legal certainty and did not impose binding 
obligations on the companies concerned". See also John Temple Lang, 'Commitment Decisions And 
Settlements With Antitrust Authorities And Private Parties Under European Antitrust Law', in Barry E. 
Hawk (ed.), International Antitrust Law & Policy, Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute 2005 (2006), p. 265, 66: „Both of these kinds of settlements [informal arrangements and conditions 
imposed in formal Commission decisions] in future will be rare, and may be obsolete. It seems less likely 
that the Commission would now accept informal settlements, except perhaps in small unimportant cases, 
since a formal procedure is now available.“ 
29 Thomas Tobias Henning, Settlements im Europäischen Kartellverfahren, p. 354 et seq., argues e.g. with the 
discretion of the Commission to take up a case, which is supposed to include a maiore ad minus the right of 
the Commission not to take up a case because of an informal deal with an undertaking. See also Richard 
Whish, 'Commitment Decisions Under Article 9 of the Modernisation Regulation: Some Unanswered 
Questions', in Martin Johansson, Nils Wahl, and Ulf Bernitz (eds.), Liber Amicorum in Honour of Sven 
Norberg, A European for all seasons (Brussels 2006), p. 571; Suzanne Rab, Daphne Monnoyeur, and Anjali 
Sukhtankar, Commitments in EU Competition Cases: Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, its application and the 
challenges ahead, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 1 vol., 3 iss., 2010, p. 173; Wouter P. J. 
Wils, Settlements of EU Antitrust Investigations: Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation No. 
1/2003, World Competition, 29 vol., 3 iss., 2006, p. 364. 
30 For a list of informal settlements in EU competition cases after 1 May 2004 see Suzanne Rab, Daphne 
Monnoyeur, and Anjali Sukhtankar, JECLAP (2010), p. 174. 
31 See e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 22 June 2009, Activity Report 2007/2008, BT-Druck. 16/13500, at p. 117 et seq. 
In fact, the president of the Bundeskartellamt, Andreas Mundt, seems to use the German word for CD 
(“Verpflichtungszusagen”) synonym for formal and informal understandings, see Andreas Mundt, 
Alternative Instrumente der Kartellbehörden, 2011, p. 9, were he talks about 30 CDs 
(“Verpflichtungszusagen”), while according to the activity report only 17 were actually formal decisions.  
32 OFT, 05/01/2011, press release PN 02/11 – Bar Council of Northern Ireland modifies its rules to address OFT 
concerns; OFT, 16/08/2012, press release PN 71/12 – OFT welcomes action by NHS trusts to ensure 
compliance with competition law. 
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The courts have not yet decided on the admissibility or inadmissibility of IUs in the light of 
the existence of formal commitment procedures. However, in the UK the CAT has touched 
upon the issue in a couple of its decisions and discussed the problem of the subversion of the 
commitment procedure.33 In IMS v. Ofcom/Red Bee Media Ltd./BBC 34 the CAT did not 
expressly legalise IUs but it pointed to a way of circumventing CDs. 
The decision generally deals with the (preliminary) question whether the case closure 
decision by the Office of Communications (Ofcom), which is concerned with a contract 
between the television broadcaster BBC and the access services35 provider Red Bee Media 
Ltd. (BBCB36), is an appealable decision falling within Sec. 46 (3) CA98. A decision to close 
a case without concluding whether or not competition law was infringed is not appealable. 
Ofcom issued a case closure decision after BBCB and BBC reduced the length of the 
exclusivity term of the contract from 10 years 5 month to 7 years 5 month. The appellant, 
Independent Media Support Ltd (IMS), argued that the decision in fact amounts to a non-
infringement decision over which the CAT has jurisdiction (see para. 11). IMS inter alia 
raised the argument that the formal commitment process, especially the procedural rights that 
protect third parties (e.g. right to be heard), are undermined when the Ofcom accepts informal 
assurances and then closes the case (para. 52). IMS referred to negotiations between Ofcom 
and BBCB/BBC regarding the length of the exclusivity term of the contract. BBCB and BBC 
refused to offer commitments in order to avoid publicity surrounding a public consultation 
(para. 64) – which in fact puts into perspective the often-raised argument that commitment 
decisions are beneficial for the undertakings concerned because they can avoid reputational 
damages37 – but discussed with Ofcom the possible effects of a voluntary reduction of the 
duration of the contract. It was controversial between the parties whether there was an actual 
                                                
33 In CAT, 08/04/2005, Case 1017/2/1/03 – Pernod-Ricard SA & Campbell Distillers Ltd. v. OFT/Bacardi-
Martini Ltd., at para. 7, this question was left open but the CAT emphasised the advantages of the 
commitment procedure, “We would simply say, as neutrally as possible, as far as the future is concerned that 
from the point of view of the effectiveness of the United Kingdom competition regime, binding 
commitments have advantages from the point of view of enforcement over voluntary assurances, and may 
well prove to be a weapon in the OFT’s armoury that needs further development. We have not, of course, 
addressed the problem of whether there remains scope for accepting voluntary commitments after the 
introduction of section 31A – that is also a matter that we leave open.” 
34 CAT, 31/10/2007, Case 1087/2/3/07 – IMS v. Ofcom/Red Bee Media Ltd./BBC, at paras. 51 et seq. 
35 These are services such as subtitling, signing, audio description etc. 
36 Red Bee Media Ltd. was formerly a wholly owned subsidiary of BBC called BBC Broadcast. 
37 See e.g. Thomas Tobias Henning, Settlements im Europäischen Kartellverfahren, p. 355; Evi Mattioli, 
Commitments and settlements in the future UK competition regime, European Competition Law Review, 34 
vol., 3 iss., 2013, p. 162. 
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understanding reached that a reduction of the exclusivity term would lead to the closure of 
the case.  
Ultimately, the CAT did not follow IMS’s reasoning (para. 57). The CAT held that there was 
no evidence of a tacit deal between Ofcom and the parties or evidence that would suggest that 
the commitment procedure was invoked informally (para. 50). On the subversion of the 
formal commitment process the CAT held (para. 53): 
“[…] [T]he regulator cannot oblige parties to an agreement to offer commitments 
where, as in this case, the parties make it clear they do not want to go down that route. 
Nor can Ofcom refuse to address a change in circumstances brought about by the 
action of the parties part way through an investigation on the grounds that the change 
could have been handled by the formal offer of commitments. In the light of this, the 
Tribunal does not regard the current case as undermining the commitments procedure 
as alleged by IMS.” 
Consequently, according to the CAT, when undertakings (due to informal negotiations with 
the competition authorities or regulators) find out what the required changes of the conduct in 
question are, they can avoid the formal commitment procedure by voluntarily adapting their 
behaviour. Hence, also the CAT supports the coexistence of IUs, commitment procedures, 
and infringement procedures. 
2. What to Expect from the Commitment Procedure? 
Given the coexistence of these three enforcement options, and in order to define (abstract) 
parameters for the procedural design of CDs, a concept of what to expect from the distinctive 
instruments will be devised. This concept is based on the observation that the instruments 
differ in terms of respect for procedural guarantees, whereby the amount of procedural 
safeguards rises respectively from IUs, to CDs, to IDs. Arguably, these procedural 
differences reflect the distinct functions (or purposes) of the enforcement tools.38 
 
 
                                                
38 Often CDs are only related to IDs, while IUs are left aside, see e.g. Wouter P. J. Wils, The Use of Settlements 
in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles, World Competition, 31 vol., 3 iss., 2008, p. 343 
et seq.; Piero Cavicchi, The European commission's discretion as to the adoption of Article 9 commitment 
decisions: Lessons from Alrosa, Discussion Paper Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European 
Integration, 3 iss., 2011, p. 10 et seq. 
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(1) Accuracy of the Standard of Intervention  
 
 
‘Instrumental’ use of competition law can be defined as a divergence of the expected standard 
of intervention (i.e. the expected theory of harm and the expected remedy39 applied in a 
certain case, given the established competition law doctrine and precedents) from the actual 
standard of intervention applied by competition authorities.40 Arguably, the ability to make 
instrumental use of competition law is inversely related to the respect for procedural 
guarantees, which in turn depends on the procedural instrument at hand.41 When comparing 
the three main enforcement instruments of the Commission and NCAs, the figure illustrates 
that in the broad spectrum of stricter and less strict procedural designs, and hence in terms of 
vulnerability to ‘instrumental enforcement’ (marked in grey in the figure), the commitment 
procedure should be positioned between IUs and formal IDs. 
 
 
                                                
39 The term ‘commitment’ and the term ‘remedy’ are used synonymously. Hence, the term ‘remedy’ is used not 
only for measures adopted by authorities in reaction to an infringement of competition law but also for 
commitments made binding that address competition concerns without a formal finding of an infringement 
of the law. 
40 Pablo Ibánez Colomo, 'On the Application of Competition Law as Reguation: Elements for a Theory', in P. 
Eeckhout, T. Tridimas, and A. Thies (eds.), Yearbook of European Law (29 vol., Oxford 2010), p. 277. 
41 The figure is an adaption of the one devised by ibid., at 287.  
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(2) Procedural Efficiency 
 
 
At the same time, under the assumption that the level of procedural efficiency (measured by 
the time and costs of the procedure) is inversely related to the respect for procedural 
guarantees, the commitment procedure should again be located between IUs and the formal 
infringement procedure.  
  
(3) Balancing the Aim of Procedural Efficiency and the Accuracy of the Standard of 
Intervention 
Considerations of procedural efficiency may, to a certain extent, justify the risk of inaccurate 
standards of intervention. As can be drawn from above, conceptually the commitment 
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With this simplified model in mind, it is possible to devise a concept of what to expect from 
the different procedures: 
Starting with the one extreme, conceptually IUs are non-binding arrangements that cannot be 
enforced, and can be reached without complying with any specific procedural requirements. 
In other words, changes in circumstances brought about by the undertakings concerned are 
taken into account by the competition authority without any formal framework. The failure to 
comply with these agreements cannot be sanctioned but the competition authority can reopen 
the proceedings. While the standard of legal certainty, transparency and accountability of the 
procedure is very low, which increases the risk of ‘instrumental’ enforcement, the procedure 
is comparatively quick and flexible. 
On the other extreme, formal unilateral infringement decisions serve to bring an infringement 
of competition law to an end by imposing binding behavioural or structural remedies on the 
undertakings concerned. The infringement procedure is strictly formalised with a view to the 
rights of the undertakings concerned and third parties,42 and there are strict requirements e.g. 
with a view to the content of the decision.43 Different to IUs, the risk of ‘instrumental’ 
enforcement via the infringement procedures is relatively low due to the strict procedural 
requirements and safeguards, whereas on the other hand the procedure is rather inflexible and 
costly.  
The design of the commitment procedure should be between these two extremes in terms of 
procedural efficiency and preventing ‘instrumental’ enforcement practices. Compared to IUs, 
the more formalised commitment procedure should provide for more legal certainty for the 
undertakings involved,44 as well as for the competition authorities.45 Furthermore, it should 
grant more rights to third parties and improve transparency.46 On the other hand, compared to 
the infringement procedure, the instrument should be quicker, more flexible, and more 
responsive to the ideas of the undertakings involved.47 In exchange for the consensual 
                                                
42 E.g. by informing the parties on the procedure, by granting the right to case files, or by ensuring the right to 
be heard. 
43 I.e. the prioritisation of behavioural remedies, and a strict application of the principle of proportionality. 
44 E.g. by ensuring that the procedure can only be reopened in exceptional circumstances. 
45 E.g. by providing that undertakings can be sanctioned in the case of a breach of the commitments. 
46 E.g. by providing that commitments have to be published, and by giving third parties the possibility to 
comment on the commitments. More generally for potential advantages compared to ‘informal settlements’ 
see e.g. Suzanne Rab, Daphne Monnoyeur, and Anjali Sukhtankar, JECLAP (2010), p. 173. 
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character, and the increased level of procedural efficiency, the protection of the interests of 
the undertakings concerned may be limited.48 At the same time, the applicability of the 
instrument should be limited to cases were no other considerations (such as the aims of 
deterrence or the development of legal doctrine) outweigh the aim of procedural efficiency.  
It is against this conceptual background that the different procedural designs in Germany and 
the UK will be compared and potential advantages and disadvantages discussed. 
II. Scope of Application 
With a view to the first important aspect of the commitment procedure – the scope of 
application – a significant degree of procedural diversity can be found: Whereas in Germany 
only few limitations exist (1.), in the UK the legislator and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
took a much stricter approach (2.). This difference can be explained by the importance 
attached to the aim of deterrence in the UK (3.). In the light of the limited standard of judicial 
review, and with a view to the concept commitment procedures devised above, the stricter 
approach in the UK appears to be preferable (4).  
1. The broad Scope of Application of the German Commitment Procedure 
The German Government apparently wanted to follow the approach of Regulation 1/2003. 
With reference to recital 13 of Regulation 1/200349 it established that CDs are unsuited in 
cases were the authority aims at imposing a fine.50 However, the Commission and the ECJ 
seem to interpret this restriction rather narrowly, and the tool of commitment decisions has 
been used in cases in which the imposition of fines was not at all improbable.51 The 
                                                                                                                                                  
47 E.g. by providing that the instrument does not require an in-depth inquiry into the facts, and the finding of an 
infringement of competition law; that the remedies should be developed by the undertakings rather than the 
authority; that remedies should be well suited to be implemented quickly; or that the remedies must be 
clearly apt solve the competition concerns at hand. 
48 E.g. with a view to the content of the commitments. 
49 Recital 13 Regulation 1/2003 suggests that CDs are not to be used in cases where alternatively the authority 
considers issuing a fines decision: “[C]ommitment decisions are not appropriate in cases where the 
Commission intends to impose a fine“. See also Commission, 2011, OJ 2011/C 308/06 – Commission notice 
on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, at para. 116: 
„Commitment decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission considers that the nature of the 
infringement calls for the imposition of a fine. Consequently, the Commission does not apply the Article 9 
procedure to secret cartels that fall under the Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel 
cases“. See further DG Competition, 2012, Antitrust Manual of Proceedings, at mod. 16 para 47, 48. 
50 Federal Government, 12 August 2004, BT-Drs. 15/3640 – Government Draft on the Seventh Amendment to 
the Act Against Restraints of Competition, at p. 34. 
51 See e.g. Commission, 18 March 2009, Commitment Decision COMP/39.402 – RWE gas foreclosure; see also 
Heike Schweitzer, Verpflichtungszusagen im Gemeinschaftsrecht, p. 638. Similarly, the ECJ, 29 June 2010, 
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exemption of so-called ‘hard core cartel conduct’52 seems to be the only binding restriction of 
the scope of application of CDs, which can be found at EU level,53 and correspondingly in 
Germany. 
2. The Stricter Approach in the UK 
On the contrary, when introducing the instrument of CDs into the national competition law 
enforcement regime of the UK,54 the legislator obligated the OFT to publish “guidance as to 
the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to accept commitments” (Sec. 31D (1) 
CA98).55 The legislator further established that the authorities “must have regard to the 
guidance” (Sec. 31D (8) CA98). As the CAT clarified, binding legal effects do not result 
from the guidance itself – as “guidance published under section 31D remains guidance, rather 
than binding rules” – but this ‘soft law’ instrument nevertheless constitutes a rule-exception-
ratio, since the guidance hast to be “generally followed by the regulatory authorities unless 
there are compelling reasons to the contrary.”56  
                                                                                                                                                  
Case C-441/07 P, ECR 2010 I-5949 – Alrosa, at para. 48 argued that “the closure of the infringement 
proceedings brought against those undertakings allows them to avoid a finding of an infringement of 
competition law and a possible fine.” 
52 For a definition of “hard core cartel conduct” see ICN Working Group on Cartels, 2005, Defining Hard Core 
Cartel Conduct: Effective Institutions, Effective Penalties, at p. 10. 
53 The Commission will only consider issuing a CD if and when “the case is not one where a fine would be 
appropriate (this therefore excludes commitment decisions in hardcore cartel cases)”, see Commission, 
17/09/2004, MEMO/04/217, Commitment decisions (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003 providing for a 
modernised framework for antitrust scrutiny of company behaviour). In addition, first approaches of self-
restraint can be found at Union level: The DG Competition issued soft law instruments that further clarify 
and restrict the scope of application of the commitment procedure, e.g. the recent “Competition policy brief” 
(March 2014, To commit or not to commit? Deciding between prohibition and commitments) or the 
‘Antitrust Manual of Proceedings’. In the policy brief it was e.g. stressed that IDs primarily are used to 
punish past behaviour, to set legal precedents, and in cases were the only possible remedy at hand is to cease 
the anti-competitive behaviour and to comply with the law in the future (p. 2), whereas CDs are used to 
adjust future behaviour of undertakings and to benefit from procedural efficiency e.g. in fast-moving 
markets (p. 4). However, the two instruments of the DG Competition are, according to the waiver published 
in the beginning of the documents (p. 1 of the policy brief and p. 2 of the Antitrust Manual of Proceedings), 
only non-binding internal guidance to the staff, or aim at providing background to policy discussion without 
binding the Commission in any way. On the other hand, the notice on best practices of the Commission, 
2011, OJ 2011/C 308/06 – Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, has a more binding character but does not contain any further requirements on 
the scope of application of the commitment procedure. 
54 Sec. 31A-31E and sched. 6A CA98, see The Competition Act 1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment), 
Regulations 2004 No. 1261, at paras. 18, 52. 
55 See for the corresponding document published by the competition authority: OFT, 2004, Enforcement 
Guidance. Another example for a MS that published a guideline including requirements for the scope of 
application of the commitment procedure is France: Autorité de la concurrence, 2009, Notice on 
Competition Commitments. 
56 CAT, 29 November 2004, Case 1026/2/3/04 – Wanadoo UK PLC v. Office of Communications, at p. 35. 
Even though the CAT does not explicitly say so, it appears to assume that this legal obligation to generally 
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While not all of the requirements of the OFT’s Enforcement Guidance refer to the scope of 
application of CDs,57 three major additional limitations can be found compared to German 
procedure: (a.) the competition concerns have to be ‘readily identifiable’, (b.) not only 
‘hardcore cartels’ but also ‘cases involving a serious abuse of a dominant position’ are 
exempted, and (c.) the aim of deterrence must not be undermined. 
a) ‘Readily Identifiable’ Competition Concerns 
With a view to the first requirement that the competition concerns have to be ‘readily 
identifiable’ any further explanation is missing. In practice, the OFT and the Regulators 
simply refer to other chapters of the decision or provide a very short summary of the 
complaints identified elsewhere, and state that based on these findings the competition 
concerns are ‘readily identifiable’.58 Hence, two potential interpretations or effects of the 
requirement come to mind: first, it narrows the scope of application of commitment decisions 
to those cases in which the competition concerns are straightforward, and excludes e.g. cases 
were novel legal issues arise or cases of a high level of uncertainty. Second, it establishes the 
obligation to engage in a profound analysis of the competition parameters and the possible 
infringements before considering the acceptance of commitments. Thus, the negotiation of 
commitments based on an unclear factual of legal basis is impermissible. 
                                                                                                                                                  
follow the guidance arises out of external factors, which are not further specified. Regarding not legally 
binding instruments, such as notices and guidelines, issued by the EU Commission (‘soft law’) it has been 
observed that the Union courts impute legal effects to these instruments only by enforcing superior 
principles of law (legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations, equal treatment; i.e. ‘hard law’ 
principles). In this way these legal devices have binding effect on the issuing authority insofar as they 
produce legitimate expectations for individuals and impose limitations on the authorities discretion, unless 
deviation from the guidelines can be justified with a view to the underlying superior legal principles. See on 
this Oana Andreea Ştefan, European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter of Hard 
Principles?, European Law Journal, 14 vol., 6 iss., 2008, p. 766, 67, 69. Applying this to the standard 
established by the CAT would suggest that “compelling reasons to the contrary” are in fact only superior 
principles of law as well. 
57 E.g. The two positive requirements, demanding that the competition concerns have to be fully addressed and 
that it must be possible to implement the commitments effectively and quickly (see Enforcement Guidance, 
at paras. 4.3, A. 14), seem to be less an issue of the scope of application than of the content of the 
commitments. The same is true for the negative requirement, according to which commitments must not be 
accepted in circumstances where compliance with and the effectiveness of any binding commitments would 
be difficult to discern (Enforcement Guidance, at paras. 4.5, A. 16), which is rather linked to the question of 
the implementation of commitments. 
58 For references to other chapters of the decision see OFT, 24 May 2005, Commitment Decision, No. 
CA98/03/2005 – TV Eye Limited, at para. 44; OFT, 1 March 2006, CA98/02/2006, CE/2479/03 – London-
wide newspaper distribution, at para. 34; Ofgem, October 2005, Commitment Decision – SP Manweb, at 
para. 7.2, fn. 16. For short summaries of the competition concerns see OFT, December 2011, Commitment 
Decision, OFT1395, CE/9388/10 – Private Motor Insuranceat para. 5.6; Ofgem, 24  May 2012, Commitment 
Decision, 76/12 – North West Ltd (connection charges), at para. 4.6. 
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b) ‘Serious Abuse of a Dominant Position’ 
Besides the restriction of the scope of application of CDs in Art. 101 TFEU-cases,59 the 
OFT’s Enforcement Guidance also restricts the use of CDs in Art. 102 TFEU-cases 
“involving serious abuses of a dominant position”. In these cases commitments will be 
accepted only “in very exceptional circumstances”.60 It has to be assessed case-by-case 
whether commitments are appropriate taking the following factors into account:61 The nature 
of the product (including goods, services, and property rights), the structure of the market, the 
market share(s) of the undertakings(s) involved, entry conditions, the effect on competitors 
and third parties and the damage caused (directly or indirectly) to consumers. Predatory 
prices will generally be regarded as a “serious abuse”. 
c) Deterrence 
The OFT’s Enforcement Guidance establishes that commitments will not be considered in 
cases where not to complete the investigations and issue an infringement decision would 
undermine deterrence.62 No comparable requirement exists in Germany and the aim of 
deterrence is generally not an issue discussed in the context of CDs adopted by the German 
NCA.  
Again, no clear parameters exist to assess in how far deterrence is sufficiently ensured. 
Looking at the practice of the NCAs and the regulators, so far no cases have been published 
in which this requirement was not met. At the same time, the argumentation patterns of the 
authorities for how the aim of deterrence is taken into account when opting for the 
commitment procedure appear very general, or even evasive.63 It is difficult to infer clear 
                                                
59 The five forms of secret cartels mentioned in the Enforcement Guidance (price-fixing, bid-rigging (collusive 
tendering), establishing output restrictions or quotas, sharing markets, dividing markets), correspond with 
the so-called ‘hardcore cartel conduct’. 
60 OFT, 2004, Enforcement Guidance, at paras. 4.4, A. 15. With regard to ‘hardcore cartel conduct’ the situation 
at the EU level seems to be even stricter than in the UK, as the Commission did not only establish a rule-
exception-ratio but excluded ‘hardcore cartel cases’ per se from commitment decisions. 
61 See ibid. at p. 12 fn. 16, p. 34 fn. 6. 
62 Ibid. at paras. 4.5, A. 16. 
63 In the context of general deterrence it is frequently emphasised that the acceptance of commitments does not 
justify any expectations to that effect that commitments in similar cases will be accepted as well, or that no 
further enforcement action will be taken in the specific sector, see e.g. OFT, 24 May 2005, Commitment 
Decision, No. CA98/03/2005 – TV Eye Limited, at para. 51; OFT, 1 March 2006, CA98/02/2006, 
CE/2479/03 – London-wide newspaper distribution, at para. 40; Ofgem, 24  May 2012, Commitment 
Decision, 76/12 – North West Ltd (connection charges), at para. 4.11. It has also been argued that CDs can 
“assist in promoting compliance with competition law by indicating the sorts of considerations” that 
undertakings engaged in similar conduct have to take into account when assessing whether such conduct 
infringes competition law (OFT, December 2011, Commitment Decision, OFT1395, CE/9388/10 – Private 
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parameters used to assess in how far deterrence is sufficiently ensured in a particular case. 
Nevertheless, compared to the way the aim of deterrence is dealt with in Germany, it must be 
said that the requirement in the UK leads at least to a more transparent approach.64 
The CAT also emphasised the requirement of the guideline according to which it is 
inappropriate to discuss commitments at all in cases of a serious infringements or where 
deterrence would be undermined.65 While the tribunal recognized that it is desirable to have a 
“mechanism through which settlements can be arrived at in appropriate cases”, it underlined 
the benefits of infringement proceedings.66 According to the CAT, the success of the CA98 
depends to a large extend on its deterrent effect and the public censure, which is why there is 
a public interest in infringement proceedings and, if necessary, the imposition of a penalty. 
Further, the CAT underlined that it is important to “enhance the visibility” of the CA98 and 
to deepen the knowledge and understanding of the business community of what is prohibited 
or not prohibited.67 The CAT stressed the importance of the administrative decision to discuss 
commitments at all, as such a step implies, or could be seen as to imply, “that the case may 
not be so serious as to warrant a decision of infringement, or that it may be appropriate to 
resolve the matter without a decision, or that the interests of deterrence, transparency, third 
parties or consumers may not reasonably require a decision to be taken”.68 Therefore, the 
tribunal held that the more important the issues that arise and the more important the sector of 
                                                                                                                                                  
Motor Insurance, at para. 5.9. See also Ofgem, October 2005, Commitment Decision – SP Manweb, at para. 
7.4). The latter appears to be, however, a rather odd line of reasoning, since CDs do not state whether or not 
there was in fact a breach of competition law. Another line of reasoning has been that the deterrent effect of 
CDs must be assessed by looking at the enforcement measures of the authorities in a specific sector at large, 
and evaluate how the commitment decisions accord with these other measures (see e.g. Ofgem, 24  May 
2012, Commitment Decision, 76/12 – North West Ltd (connection charges), at para. 4.11; Ofgem, October 
2005, Commitment Decision – SP Manweb, at para. 7.3). In terms of specific deterrence the OFT has 
argued that it is not precluded from investigating into the concerned practice in future in certain cases, where 
the requirements for the reopening of the proceedings are met (OFT, December 2011, Commitment 
Decision, OFT1395, CE/9388/10 – Private Motor Insurance, at at para. 5.8). 
64 At Union level, only non binding soft law instruments deal with the issue of deterrence: See the DG 
Competition, 2012, Antitrust Manual of Proceedings, according to which the “advantages and disadvantages 
of a commitment decision have to be weighed carefully in each individual case” (mod. 16 para. 5) when 
considering if commitment decisions are appropriate, and which mentions that CDs may have a “more 
limited deterrent effect”. See also the DG Competition, March 2014, To commit or not to commit? Deciding 
between prohibition and commitments, at pp. 2, 4. 
65 CAT, 29 November 2004, Case 1026/2/3/04 – Wanadoo UK PLC v. Office of Communications, at para. 129. 
66 Ibid., at para. 124. 
67 Ibid., at para. 124. 
68 Ibid., at para. 128. 
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economy, the more desirable is an infringement proceeding. The authorities have to balance 
these considerations taking into account the available resources.69 
3. Explaining the Differences – The Ratio of the OFT’s Enforcement Guidance 
The obligation to publish guidance on the scope of application of the commitment procedure 
is, according to the UK-government, supposed to address the tension between the aim of 
“administrative efficiency” and the aim of “maintaining the deterrent effect of competition 
legislation”.70 It is worth noting that the government emphasised this potential conflict at an 
early stage during the process of drafting the regulation on CDs, and even provided for a 
legal instrument (in form of the OFT’s obligation to publish guidance) to address this 
conflict, despite the fact that the expected impact of the new instrument on competition law 
enforcement in the UK was very low.71 This corresponds with the (false) initial expectation at 
Union level that CDs would be used only exceptionally.72 At the same time, this illustrates 
the importance attached to the aim of deterrence of competition law in the UK.73  
There is no further explanation given by the UK-government for why and in what form there 
is a tension between ‘administrative efficiency’ and the aim of ‘maintaining the deterrent 
effect of competition legislation’. In fact, one might wonder whether ‘administrative 
efficiency’ really countervails ‘deterrence’ or, on the contrary, rather contributes to it: If 
                                                
69 Ibid., at para. 126. But also in cases in which smaller companies are suspected of having infringed 
competition law, according to the CAT, an infringement decision might be desirable. Another aspect that, 
according to the CAT, should be taken into account when deciding whether or not to make commitments 
binding, are the developments under Regulation 1/2003, as the interest of complainants under Article 27 (1) 
of Regulation 1/2003 and Recital 8 to Regulation 773/2004 and the interests of other third parties including 
consumers (see para. 125). 
70 Department of Trade and Industry, 2003, Modernisation - a consultation on the Government’s proposals for 
giving effect to Regulation 1/2003 EC and for re-alignment of the Competition Act 1998, at pp. 37, 38: “We 
need to decide when commitments are an appropriate solution to a case. Should these be accepted in the 
same circumstances as the Commission’s system i.e. in cases where no fine would be envisaged? Should 
they be adopted in circumstances where the OFT proposes to find an infringement but accepts assurances in 
the interests of administrative efficiency? The Government believes that, in the interest of maintaining an 
effective competition regime, there is a balance to be struck between administrative efficiency and 
maintaining the deterrent effect of our competition legislation. The Government therefore believes there 
should be clear parameters governing when commitments may be accepted.” 
71 For a corresponding assessment of the OFT see e.g. Department of Trade and Industry, 2003, Regulatory 
Impact Assessment Giving Effect to Council Regulation 1/2003, recital 2.16: “However, binding 
commitments will only be accepted in certain types of cases and the OFT expects only a small minority of 
investigations to be terminated by acceptance of binding commitments. This means that the savings to 
business and to the OFT associated with this area of the policy are likely to be minimal and the impact 
therefore negligible. It is not therefore discussed further.” 
72 John Temple Lang, Commitment Decisions And Settlements, p. 270. 
73 Also, the OFT recently commissioned a study on deterrence: OFT, 2011, The impact of competition 
interventions on compliance and deterrence. 
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deterrence increases with the increase in the difference between the expected rewards of 
anticompetitive behaviour on the one hand, and the expected costs divided by the probability 
the illegal activity will be detected and sanctioned on the other hand,74 and if ‘administrative 
efficiency’ increases the probability that the illegal activity will be detected and sanctioned, 
then ‘administrative efficiency’ increases ‘deterrence’. Accordingly, in a more recent 
comment, the UK-government emphasized the need to run more cases in order to increase 
deterrence.75 Hence, there must be another reason for this perceived conflict of aims. One 
potential explanation might be that in the context of CDs ‘administrative efficiency’ is 
defined as ‘cost reduction’ rather than ‘contribution to the detection and sanctioning of 
cartels’. One could take the view that while the faster and more flexible commitment 
procedure relieves the workload of competition authorities, it does not contribute to 
deterrence as it lacks any punitive character. As undertakings voluntarily offer commitments, 
and as no breach of competition law is found in the commitment procedure, arguably a CDs 
is not a ‘sanction’ in the narrower sense. At the same time, without the finding of an 
infringement, arguably one cannot talk about the detection of illegal conduct. On the other 
hand, it is questionable in how far undertakings act ‘voluntarily’ when confronted with a 
vague theory of harm and the threat of a high fine (infra C.III). At the same time, 
commitments may well exceed what could be imposed unilaterally on the undertaking via an 
ID, and may therefore be a much higher burden for the undertaking involved (supra B). 
Hence, it does not seem unlikely that the commitment procedure contributes to the deterrent 
effect of competition law enforcement. 
Nevertheless, since the inquiries into the facts by the competition authority, as well as the 
judicial review are restricted in the commitment procedure, the decisions are of limited value 
when it comes to the guiding character of the law. Hence, as the CAT pointed out as well 
(supra C.II.2.c), an overuse of the instrument of CDs might endanger the function of 
                                                
74 John M. Connor and Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, Cardozo Law 
Review, 34 vol., 2012, p. 429. 
75 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2012, Growth, Competition and the Competition Regime, 
Government Response to Consultation, at para. 6.17: “The Government remains concerned that too few 
cases are taken forward. Notwithstanding the importance of prioritisation and a focus on impact when 
selecting cases to take forward, a regime in which the cost and burden of establishing cases is such that 
relatively few decisions are made will lead to less deterrence and a diluted economic impact than one in 
which more cases could be run.” 
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competition law as norms guiding the behaviour of undertakings in the market, and deterring 
anticompetitive conduct.76 
4. Discussion 
In the light of limited ex-post judicial review of CDs and the resulting threat of negative 
externalities, the decrease in legal certainty, and the reduction of the deterrent effect of 
competition law, the UK’s approach to further limit the scope of application of the 
commitment procedure ex-ante seems to be worthwhile. At the same time, the stricter 
approach corresponds more closely to the concept devised above, according to which CDs 
should balance the aim of procedural economy and other aims such as the accuracy of the 
standard of intervention of competition law. The efficiency gains of the commitment 
procedure might not be sufficient to outweigh the negative effects of the instrument in cases 
were the level of uncertainty does not allow for devising quick and accurate theories of harm 
(and corresponding remedies) without further in-depth investigations; were the seriousness of 
the infringement calls for a comprehensive investigation; or were the aim of deterrence 
cannot be met by consensual proceedings. 
III. Negotiation of Commitments 
The procedural frameworks at national level concerning the negotiation of commitments are 
characterised by a significant degree of diversity as well: While the German commitment 
procedure seems to lack strict requirements (1.), in the UK the CAT established high 
standards for the initiation of the negotiations and the information base of the undertakings 
concerned (2.). With a view to the reduced standard of judicial control and the concept of 
CDs as an instrument that balances the aim of procedural economy with the aim to apply 
optimal remedies, strict procedural requirements governing the negotiation process seem to 
be preferable (3.). 
                                                
76 Philippe Choné, Saïd Suoam, and Arnold Vialfont, On the optimal use of commitment decisions under 
European coompetition law, International Review of Law and Economics, 37 vol., 2014, argue that in 
Art. 102 TFEU-cases the commitment procedure weakens or potentially even eliminates deterrence (p. 170). 
However, the paper is based on some questionable assumptions (e.g. that the procedure starts when the 
Commission informs the undertakings concerned in form of a written prelimnary assessment (p. 170, on the 
contrary see infra C.III), or that the competition authority is able to credibly announce its enforcement policy 
ex ante (p. 177)), and doesn’t take into account important features of the commitment procedure practice, 
e.g. that commitments may go beyond what could realistically be imposed unilaterally on the undertakings 
(p. 177). 
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1. The Rather Informal Design of Commitment Negotiations in Germany 
In Germany, before issuing a CD the BK has to open proceedings and inform the 
undertakings concerned about its preliminary competition concerns (Sec. 32b (1) ARC). 
However, there are no explicit rules governing the initiation and the exact conditions of the 
negotiations of commitments.  
In practice, some cases suggest that the German NCA takes a very proactive role in devising 
remedies and does not leave the design of the commitments to the undertakings involved. For 
example, in one case – which will be discussed in more detail below (infra D.I.2.a)bb)) – 
before issuing CDs, a document was published by the BK, which not only assessed the legal 
and factual questions surrounding the contracts in question, but also suggested different 
models of how to design the contracts to bring them in line with the competition rules.77 
Furthermore, after negotiating with the undertakings, it seems to have been the authority 
itself rather than the undertakings that suggested and formulated the commitments. The BK 
sent a letter to the undertakings concerned in which it set out the commitments that were 
necessary in the eyes of the authority in order to end the proceedings.78 Arguably, a stricter 
design of the negotiation process might have considerably changed the much-criticised 
outcome of the procedure. 
Furthermore, due to a lack of a written form requirement, it appears that in practice (in some 
cases) CDs are based only on oral negotiations.79 However, the right of the undertakings 
concerned to access the case files of the BK,80 might be an important substitute for a (prior) 
written preliminary assessment. 
2. The More Formalised Approach of the CAT 
In the UK, the CAT established (in form of an obiter dictum) stricter requirements.81 The 
tribunal held that the prospective defendant, rather than the regulatory authority, should take 
initiative in exploring the possibility of offering binding commitments, and that the 
                                                
77 Bundeskartellamt, 25 January 2005, B 8-113/03, Kartellrechtliche Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen 
Gasverträgen. 
78 See e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 13 September 2005, press release – Öffnung der langfristigen Gasverträge wird 
kommen. 
79 Bundeskartellamt, 2. December 2008, Commitment Decision B10-36/08 – Süwag Energie AG (Gas Prices), at 
para. 4. 
80 This right follows from general administrative law (Sec. 29 VwVfG). 
81 CAT, 29 November 2004, Case 1026/2/3/04 – Wanadoo UK PLC v. Office of Communications, at 122 et seq. 
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discussions should be based on a written summary of the authority’s competition concerns, 
and the main facts on which the concerns are based.82  
The case dealt with the pricing policies employed by the BT Group plc (BT) when providing 
residential broadband services, and an alleged infringement of Sec. 18 CA98 and/or Art. 102 
TFEU in form of a margin squeeze.83 Ofcom entered into (unsuccessful) oral negotiations 
with BT to explore the possibility of a CD, and therefore revealed to BT that it would issue a 
statement of objections unless appropriate commitments were offered. On the first issue, the 
initiation of the discussion of commitments, the CAT opposed the Ofcom’s view that the 
draft guideline leaves it entirely open whether a regulator might ask an undertaking to offer 
commitments or not.84 At the same time, the tribunal held that it is at the discretion of the 
authority whether or not to consider accepting commitments that may be offered.85 Once the 
authority decided that it is appropriate to discuss commitments, according to the CAT, it can 
be inferred from the draft guideline (para. 4.18) that the discussions should be based on a 
written summary of the authority’s competition concerns and the main facts on which the 
concerns are based. Supposedly, this is not only necessary with a view to the rights of the 
                                                
82 The Tribunal took account of the fact that the OFT, April 2004, 407a, Draft Guideline on Enforcement was a 
working paper, and that the final version was not published yet. However, the CAT held that the draft had a 
“persuasive force pending the issuance of the final version” and should be considered as the published 
guidance, especially as the OFT could otherwise be “regarded as in breach of its statutory duty under section 
31D of the [Competition] Act [1998]” (para. 116). At the same time, the CAT refused to express any view 
on the particular facts of the current case (para. 133). 
83 The Director General of Telecommunications (“Director”, predecessor of Ofcom) initially conducted an 
investigation into BT’s pricing practices in the period to June 2002 and found that BT had not abused a 
dominant position during that period. That decision was subject to an appeal to the CAT by the complainant 
Freeserve.com PLC (“Freeserve”, now Wanadoo UK PLC (“Wanadoo”)). The appeal was upheld and the 
Director undertook to reconsider the issue. He took a further decision in relation to the conduct in the period 
up to June 2002 that BT was not operating a margin squeeze. An appeal by Freeserve against this decision 
has been adjourned pending Ofcom’s decision in the current investigation. At the same time, as 
reconsidering this original decision into BT’s pricing in the period up to June 2002, the Director also decided 
to investigate BT’s residential pricing for a subsequent period. Ofcom assumed the functions of the Director 
in respect of the investigation following its creation in 2003. The investigation covered BT’s conduct in the 
period from 1 June 2002 to 31 December 2004. Ofcom has concluded that the evidence is insufficient to 
support a finding that BT abused a dominant position during the period investigated (Ofcom, 2 November 
2010, Decision CW/00613/04/03 – Investigation into BT's residential broadband pricing). On the 16 
December 2010 the Tribunal made an order granting permission to the appellant to withdraw the appeal 
(CAT, 16 December 2010, Case 1026/2/3/04 – Wanadoo UK PLC v. Office of Communications. For a 
summary of the facts see CAT, 29 November 2004, Case 1026/2/3/04 – Wanadoo UK PLC v. Office of 
Communications, at para. 3-74; Ofcom, 2 November 2010, Decision CW/00613/04/03, at paras. 1.1-1.27). 
84 CAT, 29 November 2004, Case 1026/2/3/04 – Wanadoo UK PLC v. Office of Communications, at para 127 
(“[E]specially at paragraphs 4.16-4.19 [of the draft guideline], it is the prospective defendant undertaking 
which will propose the offer of binding commitments to the regulatory authority.”). See also ibid., at paras. 
76, 77. The Ofcom stressed the importance of entering into discussion with the party that might offer 
commitments, as according to the draft guideline the commitments have to be well defined. However, it is 
not clear why the regulatory authority should be the one to initiate these discussions. 
85 Ibid., at para 123. See for more details on the criteria to exercise this discretion supra C.II.2.c). 
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prospective defendant, to ensure that all relevant considerations are taken into account, but 
also efficient in the light of para. 2 of sched. 6a CA98, according to which the authorities 
have to give public notice at a latter stage anyway.86  
An issue that has not been discussed by the CAT and that remains unclear also under the 
OFT’s Enforcement Guidance is the question in how far access to case files has to be 
warranted to the undertakings concerned.87 
3. Discussion 
With a view to the output of the procedure and the functioning of competition law, it might 
be argued that the possibility to negotiate with the undertakings concerned at an early stage 
and in an informal manner is an important tool – especially in cases of high uncertainty and 
fast developing markets – to quickly clarify the facts of the case, and to find efficient 
solutions for the competition concerns at hand. It has even been argued that authorities should 
always think about (whether there are) possible remedies, before deciding on enforcing and 
applying competition law. In this logic remedies influence liability standards, and in cases 
where no remedy comes to mind one should abstain from enforcing the law.88 Therefore, 
arguably, it might be inefficient to first devise a comprehensive (written) summary of the 
competition concerns before discussing potential solutions; it would thus follow that a less 
formal framework appears to be preferable. 
However, while it seems widely accepted that enforcers should think about remedies at an 
early stage of the procedure, the idea that the finding of an infringement and the design of the 
remedy coincide, or that the latter should be considered before the prior, is subject to 
controversy.89 Moreover, while some might argue that authorities should not enforce the law 
                                                
86 Ibid., at para. 130. 
87 This has been clarified only for interim measures and directions, see OFT, 2004, Enforcement Guidance, at 
paras. 2.4, 3.13, 3.14. The guideline of the French competition authority is much more explicit, see Autorité 
de la concurrence, 2009, Notice on Competition Commitments, at paras. 27-30, pointing out especially the 
right of access of the applicant and the undertaking concerned to the preliminary assessment and third parties 
comments. 
88 With a view to US antitrust remedies and using the metaphor of a tiger Thomas o. Barnett, Section 2 
Remedies: What to Do After Catching the Tiger by the Tail, Presentation at the American Bar Association 
Conference on Monopolization Remedies Charlottesville, Virginia, 2008, p. 3: “In sum, it is critical to think 
hard about what you are going to do with the tiger before you grab its tail. If you cannot do something 
constructive, you should consider not grabbing it in the first place. And in any event, it is not the best time to 
determine what to do with the tiger while holding on to its tail.” 
89 Per Hellstrom, Frank Maier-Rigaud, and Friedrich Wenzel Bulst, Remedies in European Antitrus Law, 
Antitrust Law Journal, 76 vol., 2009-2010, p. 49: “One must not succumb to an ‘if you can't fix it easily, it 
ain't broken’ fallacy. Not trying to fix something is only an option when it is not broken.” 
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despite the finding of an infringement, or that finding a remedy might help to identify the 
infringement,90 no one argues that one should over-enforce, which is apply remedies absent 
of an infringement of competition law or that exceed the competition concerns at hand. Yet, 
when negotiating commitments informally, without any procedural restrictions, chances are 
that neither the competition authority nor the undertakings involved are interested in 
clarifying the facts or solving the competition concerns. While the authorities might pursue 
policy aims that exceed the protection of a system of undistorted competition (e.g. market 
liberalisation), the undertakings involved focus on avoiding costly and lengthy proceedings, 
the finding of an infringement of competition law, and the corresponding bad reputation and 
danger of private damages claims. Furthermore, there is a danger that competition authorities 
approach the undertakings concerned and negotiate – based on a vague theory of harm and 
without any detailed information on the factual background – far-reaching commitments that 
potentially aim at policy goals very different from the protection of undistorted competition.91 
In this scenario, the preliminary assessment of the case no longer serves to identify the 
relevant competition issues of the case but to justify rather discretionary remedies.92  
Hence, procedural safeguards are needed to align the aims of the competition authorities and 
the undertakings involved with the aims of competition law, i.e. the protection of the 
competitive process.93 Following the concept that CDs should balance the objective of 
procedural economy and the objective of applying accurate standards of competition law 
enforcement, it can be argued that – different from IUs – there should be strict rules 
governing the negotiation process. 
                                                
90 Thomas o. Barnett, (2008), Section 2 Remedies, p. 2. 
91 Heike Schweitzer, Verpflichtungszusagen im Gemeinschaftsrecht, p. 647. 
92 These concerns have been expressed with a view to the practice of the Commission, see only Christopher J. 
Cook, Commitment Decisions: The Law and Practice under Article 9, World Competition, 29 vol., 2 iss., 
2006, p. 215, 16. For critical comments towards this practice see e.g. Heike Schweitzer, Commitment 
decisions under Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003, p. 570; Yves Bottemann and Agapi Patsa, Towards a more 
sustainable use of commitment decisions in Article 102 TFEU cases, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 1 
vol., 2 iss., 2013, p. 370. 
93 For a similar conclusion see Damien Gerard, 'Negotiated remedies in the modernization era: the limits of 
effectiveness', in Philip Lowe and Mel Marquis (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2013: Effective 
and Legitimate Enforcement (Oxford 2014 (forthcoming)), p. 14. It is often criticised that the ‘process of 
competition’ is an ambiguous term. By ‘process of competition’ I refer to competition as a “discovery 
process”, that is a “process which enables individuals to use more knowledge than they have and to find out 
whether their plans are successful”, see Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, A Legal Theory Without Law, Posner v. 
Hayek on Economic Analysis of Law, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1168422 (accessed 26 
July 2014), 2008, p. 29. 
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A similar argument can be made with a view to the aim of substituting full ex-post judicial 
review by applying ex-ante procedural safeguards: to justify the reduced requirements 
regarding judicial control (and especially of the principle of proportionality) but also the 
rights of defence, it is frequently argued that the undertakings ‘voluntarily’ offer the 
commitments that are made binding on them by the competition authority.94 In fact, it seems 
acceptable that the parties that offer commitments have to bear the consequences – provided 
that they take an informed and free decision. This, however, presupposes that the 
undertakings are well informed about the competition concerns they are supposed to address. 
Only when the undertakings know precisely what the accusations are can they make an 
informed and reasonable decision as to the commitments they are willing to offer. Hence, a 
too limited approach with respect to the information that needs to be provided to the 
undertakings involved renders void the justification of the restriction of procedural rights as 
well as of the judicial control of CDs.  
Consequently, as a general rule, it should be prevented that competition authorities initiate – 
or even force upon undertakings – the discussion of commitments, and negotiate remedies 
without the opening of a (formal) procedure, without issuing a (written) preliminary 
assessment of the case, and without warranting sufficient access to the case files.95 
IV. Preliminary Assessment 
Apart from the concerns discussed above, surrounding the negotiations of commitments and 
the problem that the preliminary assessment might be tailored in a way to justify (inaccurate) 
commitments that the authority and the undertakings have informally agreed on, the question 
arises of how detailed this document must actually be. While in Germany no clear standard 
exists, the OFT established at least an abstract parameter (1.), which seems to correspond 
more closely to the concept devised above (2.).  
                                                
94 See e.g. ECJ, 29 June 2010, Case C-441/07 P, ECR 2010 I-5949 – Alrosa, at para. 48: „Undertakings which 
offer commitments on the basis of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 consciously accept that the 
concessions they make may go beyond what the Commission could itself impose on them in a decision 
adopted under Article 7 of the regulation after a thorough examination.“ 
95 Accordingly, practitioners demand that in practice the offer of commitments should be based on a detailed 
preliminary assessment of the case and not only on a brief oral presentation, Tobias Klose, 2014, Die 
Zusagenpraxis der Kommission nach Art. 9 VO Nr. 1/2003, Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht, Internationales 
Forum EU-Kartellrecht, Brüssel, at slide 10. 
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1. The Content of Preliminary Assessments – Different Standards in Germany and the 
UK 
In Germany no further clarifying requirements as to the exact content of the preliminary 
assessment can be found. In fact, the exact level of scrutiny and the required depth of the 
investigation of the NCA are subject to controversy. While some argue that the facts of the 
case have to be completely identified and only the legal assessment may be subject to a 
limited assessment,96 others contend that both the facts and the legal assessment are subject to 
a limited inquiry only.97 
In contrast, by establishing that the competition concerns must be “readily identifiable” (see 
already supra II.2.a) before adopting commitments may be considered,98 the OFT seems to 
have set stricter requirements: The preliminary assessment has to allow for a clear and 
unambiguous evaluation of the competition concerns, which suggests that the factual and 
legal assessment have to meet a certain minimum degree of scrutiny.  
2. Discussion 
With a view to the required level of investigation and reasoning in the preliminary assessment 
(again) a conflict of aims arises. The aim of a time- and cost-efficient procedure indicates that 
the corresponding efforts should be minimized. On the contrary, the objective to protect 
procedural rights of the undertakings concerned and of third parties, as well as the public 
interest in a transparent, rule-based and judicable competition law enforcement indicate that 
the level of scrutiny applied should be maximised. The preliminary assessment is supposed to 
be the basis for the undertakings concerned to design the commitments they offer. 
Furthermore, as the concerns stated in the preliminary assessment are the basis for assessing 
the proportionality of the commitments, judicial control is equally dependent on a thoroughly 
drafted document. Hence, procedural safeguards should ensure a minimum level of diligence 
of competition authorities when issuing a preliminary assessment of the case.  
On a more abstract level, this conflict relates to the legal nature of CDs. The more the 
instrument is perceived as a tool of public law enforcement rather than a settling mechanism, 
the more due process rules and administrative transparency have to be emphasised, and the 
                                                
96 Albrecht Bach, '§ 32 b GWB', in Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (eds.), Wettbewerbsrecht, 
GWB, Kommentar zum Deutschen Kartellrecht (4 edn., 2 vol. 2007), at paras. 10, 11. 
97 Eckard Rehbinder, '§ 32 b GWB', in Ulrich Loewenheim, Karl M. Meessen, and Alexander Riesenkampff 
(eds.), Kartellrecht, Kommentar (2 edn., München 2009), at para. 6. 
98 See the OFT, 2004, Enforcement Guidance, at paras. 4.3, A. 14. 
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more important it will be to obligate the competition authorities to carefully define their 
theories of harm before entering into negotiations of commitments.99 Following the concept 
that (in terms of strictness) the procedural requirements of the commitment procedure should 
be between the two extremes of IUs and the IDs, it can be argued that at least some minimum 
standards should apply to the drafting of the preliminary assessment. These might enhance 
legal certainty and contribute to safeguard the rule of law. 
V. Content of Commitments  
While there are no further requirements concerning the content of IUs, the remedies available 
in IDs are limited by the application of the principle of proportionality and the prioritisation 
of behavioural over structural remedies.100 Conceptually, the requirements concerning the 
content of CDs should be somewhere in between, balancing the aim of procedural economy 
and the application of an accurate standard of intervention of competition law (supra C.I.2). 
The question arises whether the procedural frameworks at national level strike the right 
balance in this regard. 
1. Prioritising Procedural Economy? 
In Germany, no further procedural parameters concerning the content of commitments that 
limit potential under- or over-enforcement of competition law exist. The question whether it 
is sufficient for commitments to change the facts of the case only to the extend that it falls 
outside the enforcement priorities of the BK 101  (potential Type-II errors (under-
enforcement)), or on the contrary whether the competition concerns have to be fully removed, 
is as much subject to controversy,102 as the question in how far behavioural remedies should 
be prioritised over structural remedies (potential Type-I errors (over-enforcement)).103  
In the UK no particular safeguards concerning the content of commitments dealing with 
potential over-enforcement via CDs can be found either. The OFT’s guideline mentions that 
                                                
99 Heike Schweitzer, Commitment decisions under Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003, p. 570. 
100 See e.g. Art. 7 (1) Regulation 1/2003, which expressly says that “Structural remedies can only be imposed 
either where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural 
remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy”. 
101 This question remains open at Union level also after the Alrosa-judgement oft he ECJ. 
102 Joachim Bornkamm, § 32b GWB, at para. 7 seems to take the view that it is enough to address the 
enforcement priorities of the NCA, while Albrecht Bach, § 32 b GWB, at para. 14 and Eckard Rehbinder, § 
32 b GWB, at para. 6 take the view that this does not suffice. 
103 According to Albrecht Bach, § 32 b GWB, at para. 15 behavioural should be prioritised, whereas e.g. Eckard 
Rehbinder, § 32 b GWB, at para. 6 argues that structural measures are more acceptable in CDs compared to 
IDs. 
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commitments may be structural or behavioural but falls short of establishing any priority 
(para. 4.6.). One of the few explicit restrictions established by the OFT’s Enforcement 
Guidance is that commitments are generally adopted for a specified period only (para. 4.8). 
Furthermore, there is a clear rule to be found in the guidance, according to which it is only 
likely for the authority to consider the acceptance of commitments where the competition 
concerns are “fully” addressed. 104  This requirement excludes the possibility to make 
commitments binding that are limited to address the enforcement priorities of the authority. 
2. Discussion 
As mentioned above, (potentially) the principle of proportionality applies to CDs with a 
reduced standard only (supra B). Additionally, taking into account the procedural 
requirements concerning the content of commitments in Germany and (to a certain extend) as 
well in the UK, the aim of procedural economy seems to outweigh the concerns of applying 
inaccurate standards of competition law. Further restrictions, such as the prioritisation of 
behavioural over structural remedies, are missing. Arguably, this design conflicts with the 
concept that the commitment procedure should strive to balance procedural economy with the 
aim of adopting optimal remedies, and the objective to substitute for comprehensive judicial 
control.  
VI. Third Parties 
The reduced standard of the proportionality test applied by the ECJ potentially leads to 
negative externalities of CDs (supra B). Therefore, the court emphasised the need to take into 
account the “interests of third parties” when adopting CDs. However, due to the fact that CDs 
are based on a preliminary assessment of the case only, and are therefore often characterised 
by a high level of uncertainty, it is difficult to assess and account for externalities of 
commitments offered by undertakings. Hence, the question arises whether the commitment 
procedure provides for sufficient safeguards. 
In the UK – similar to the situation at Union level (Art. 27 (4) Regulation 1/2003) – the 
commitment procedure involves a so-called ‘market test’ (1.), which gives third parties the 
opportunity to comment on the commitments offered. On the contrary, in Germany the 
commitment procedure is less open for third party comments (2.). These procedural 
differences reflect the conflict between the potential control functions of third parties on the 
                                                
104 OFT, 2004, Enforcement Guidance, at paras. 4.3, A. 14. 
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one hand, and the danger of abusive comments on the other hand, and might be explained by 
different legal cultures and perceptions of the nature of competition law (3.).  
1. The Requirement of a ‘Market Test’ in the UK 
In the UK (in practice) all ‘interested’ parties have the possibility to comment on the 
proposed commitments.105 It is, however, not entirely clear what kind of procedural status 
participants of the market test obtain. Accordingly, it remains open to what extent third 
parties have a right to access files or to receive a non-confidential version of the preliminary 
assessment. As third parties generally seem to be limited to the information supplied to them 
by the summary of the authorities, the question arises of how detailed this summary has to 
be.106 On the other hand, there is a certain risk of abusive comments, as third parties follow 
commercial interests that are not necessarily in line with the public interest in protecting the 
competitive process. Therefore, the involvement of third parties has to be controlled and 
restricted. Hence, there is a balance to be struck. 
In this context, the CAT was confronted with the issue of the timing of the involvement of 
third parties, and the question to what extent the negotiations between the NCA and the 
undertaking concerned should be confidential:  
In Wanadoo UK PLC v. Office of Communications the complainant (Wanadoo) argued that it 
should have been more involved in the process. The regulator (Ofcom) should have provided 
a summary of the reasons why, according to its provisional view, the undertaking concerned 
(BT) had infringed competition law and which exceptional circumstances allowed the 
exploration of commitments.107 According to Wanadoo, the mere fact that it would have been 
                                                
105 It is mandatory for the competition authority to give third parties the opportunity to comment on 
commitments before making them binding (paras. 2, 3 sched. 6a CA98). According to the OFT’s 
Enforcement Guidance public consultation is necessary where the OFT proposes to accept commitments; 
where, following a first consultation period, the OFT intends to accept commitments with any material 
modification; before accepting variations of commitments; before releasing a person or persons from any 
binding commitments (paras. 4.21-4.23). The notice of the proposed commitment has to be brought “to the 
attention of those likely to be affected” by the matter in question (para. 8 schedule 6a CA98). Even though 
the wording suggests that only a limited group of third parties, who demonstrate that they are affected by the 
case, will have the opportunity to make representation, in practice the authorities seems to take a more 
liberal approach. They generally invite all interested parties to comment on the proposed commitments. See 
e.g. Ofgem, 23 November 2011, 158/11 – Notice of intention to accept binding commitments from 
Electricity North West Limited , at p. 1: “This document sets out why we are minded to accept the 
commitments and invites responses from interested third parties on this proposed course of action.” 
106 The OFT, 2004, Enforcement Guidance, at paras. 4.21-4.23 require to give a summary of the key issues, the 
proposed commitments, and to explain how the commitments meet the OFT’s competition concerns.  
107 CAT, 29 November 2004, Case 1026/2/3/04 – Wanadoo UK PLC v. Office of Communications, at paras. 87, 
88. 
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consulted on commitments after the negotiations would not have been a sufficient substitute. 
Ofcom would have already formed an opinion as to whether the commitments are 
appropriate, and Wanadoo would therefore have faced an “uphill battle to persuade 
Ofcom”.108 Without an early involvement of Wanadoo, the transparency and balance of the 
proceedings would be reduced, and there would be a danger of an asymmetry of information, 
which might prevent an operation at arm’s-length.109  
On the contrary, Ofcom took the view that there is no inappropriate inequality, even without 
an involvement of the complainant at a very early stage, as a complainant will always have 
the right to make representations if commitments are proposed.110 Ofcom claims that there is 
no obligation to produce a summary of its competition concerns for the benefit of third 
parties, as a summary is produced for the party under investigation only – given that (unlike 
in this case) there is enough time to produce such a written summary at all.111 According to 
Ofcom it should also be taken into account that in the case the parties cannot agree on 
commitments, it might be inappropriate to reveal that they were ever discussed.112 Similarly, 
BT argued that the asymmetry of information should not be exaggerated. The undertaking 
contended that there were good reasons for Ofcom not to make a public announcement before 
the statement of objections (‘rule 14 notice’) has been made available to the addressee, e.g. 
that the addressee needs the opportunity to prepare a response to the announcement.113  
Finally, the CAT opted for a compromise. It recognised that negotiations may need to be 
confidential at an initial stage, “if only to permit a defendant undertaking to approach the 
regulatory authority on a ‘without prejudice’ basis”. At the same time, the tribunal found that 
there is some asymmetry between the position of the prospective defendant and the 
complainant. The CAT acknowledged that the complainant is protected insofar as he has the 
right to respond to the public notice (issued under para. 2 sched. 6A CA98), and because he 
                                                
108 Ibid., at para. 89. Wanadoo argued that the draft guideline provides for a four-step-procedure, according to 
which first the alleged infringer states that it wishes to offer commitments; second the competition authority 
publishes a summary of the competition concerns and gives third parties an opportunity to comment; third 
the alleged infringer offers commitments and the authority considers them, taking into account the comments 
of third parties; and finally, fourth, the authority enters into negotiations with the alleged infringer (paras. 90, 
91). 
109 Especially if regulators decisions may be price sensitive they should, according to Wanadoo, be publicly 
announced as soon as possible. Ibid., at paras. 93-95. 
110 Ibid., at para. 79. 
111 Ibid., at para. 80. 
112 Ibid., at para. 81. 
113 Ibid., at paras. 100, 101. 
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can appeal any decision of the authority before the Tribunal (by way of review under Sec. 47 
(1) c and para. 3A sched. 8 CA98).114 Nevertheless, the CAT took the view that the authority 
should bear in mind the position of the complainant “in the course of any negotiations”.115 
The CAT suggested “in particular exceptional circumstances some kind of consultation with 
a complainant before the stage of the notice under Schedule 6A is reached”, especially when 
the complainant has detailed knowledge of the market or may be closely affected by the 
outcome.116 
2. The Less Extensive Involvement of Third Parties in German Commitment 
Procedures 
Different from the situation in the UK, there is no legal requirement in Germany establishing 
a ‘market test’ or obligating the NCA to include third parties in the commitment procedure. 
Pursuant to Sec. 56 (2) ARC it is at the discretion of the Bundeskartellamt to give specific 
affected economic stakeholders the possibility to make representation. The provision aims at 
facilitating the evaluation of the case by the authority and does not aim at guaranteeing a right 
to be heard of third parties.117 Only parties to the proceeding (‘Beteiligte’), which are (besides 
the potential addressee of the decision (Sec. 54 (2) no. 2 ARC)) especially parties whose 
interests are “significantly affected” by the decision, and who make a request to the authority 
to be admitted to the procedure (Sec. 54 (2) no. 3 ARC),118 must be provided with the 
opportunity to make comments (Sec. 56 (1) ARC). Only this specification of the 
constitutional right to be heard (Art. 103 (1) GG) establishes the obligation to provide 
information on the facts of the case, the evaluation of these facts by the authority, as well as 
access to case files.119 
                                                
114 Ibid., at para. 131. Here the CAT explicitly left open the question of the relationship between Sec. 47 (1) c 
and para. 3A Schedule 8 CA98 but indicated that this will have to be clarified. 
115 Ibid., at para. 132. 
116 Ibid., at para. 132. The Cat bases this suggestion i.a. on the wording of Art. 27 (1) Regulation 1/2003, 
according to which the complainant has to be “associated closely with the proceedings”. However, as it is 
actually Art. 27 (4) Regulation 1/2003, which deals with commitment decisions, the argument appears to be 
a little misplaced. 
117 Carsten Becker, '§ 56 GWB', in Ulrich Loewenheim, Karl M. Meessen, and Alexander Riesenkampff (eds.), 
Kartellrecht, Kommentar (2 edn., München 2009), at para. 13. Furthermore, the Bundeskartellamt can, in 
order to obtain information necessary to carryout its tasks entrusted to it by the ARC, demand certain 
information from undertakings pursuant to Sec. 59 ARC. 
118 Ibid., at para. 1. 
119 The status of being party to the proceeding (pursuant to Sec. 54 (2), (3) ARC) is generally also prerequisite 
for the right to initiate judicial control of the decision (Sec. 63 (2) ARC). 
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3. Discussion 
Since the level of inquiry into the facts of the preliminary assessment is limited in the 
commitment procedure, and as competition authorities (at least according to the ECJ’s Alrosa 
judgement) are not obligated to make a full proportionality assessment of the commitments 
(supra B), third parties’ comments can be seen as an important control mechanism with a 
view to the wide margin of discretion of NCAs and the increased risk of negative 
externalities. Again, a significant degree of procedural diversity exists concerning the 
requirements for the consultation and involvement of third parties. While in the UK a ‘market 
test’ is an integral part of the commitment procedure, in Germany the involvement of third 
parties in the commitment procedure is more restricted. The comparatively less prominent 
participation of third parties in the German commitment procedure might be explained by the 
traditionally high importance of the non-politic, legal nature of competition law.120 While the 
involvement of third parties might be important to protect procedural rights and reduce the 
risk of negative externalities of CDs, there is a certain danger that (economic or political) 
interests of third parties influence competition law enforcement, and even increase the risk of 
anticompetitive commitments.121 The interests of third parties do not necessarily represent the 
public interest in a system of undistorted competition, and the right to comment might even 
be abused to harm competitors. In consequence, while the ‘market test’ is an important tool to 
counter the threat of negative externalities of CDs, extensive safeguards are needed (e.g. with 
a view to the timing of the consultation) to avoid a ‘politicization’ of competition law and the 
influence of individual commercial interests. 
VII. Implementation and Enforcement  
CDs are – unlike IUs – binding and enforceable decisions.122 At the same time, the fact that 
the companies under investigation participate in the design of the commitments arguably 
                                                
120 See on the understanding of German competition law as a non-political, legal regime e.g. Heike Schweitzer, 
The European Competition Law Enforcement System and the Evolution of Judicial Review, p. 110, 18. 
121 Therefore, as “interests” of third parties pursuant to Sec. 54 (2) no. 3 ARC only legal or economical interests 
(and not e.g. environmental interests) are recognized, see Hans-Helmut Schneider, '§ 54 GWB', in Hermann-
Josef Bunte (ed.), Langen/Bunte Kartellrecht, Kommentar (12 edn., 1 vol., Köln 2014), at para. 27. 
122 CDs of the Commission can be enforced by the authority itself (by imposition of a fine pursuant to 
Art. 23 (2) lit. c or periodic penalty payments pursuant to Art. 24 (1) lit. c Regulation 1/2003) or by NCAs 
and national courts (Art. 4 para. 3 TEU). In the UK CDs are enforceable by the OFT as directions (see 
Enforcement Guidance, at para.  4.28), which is by application to the court for an order requiring compliance 
with the decision within a specific time (Enforcement Guidance, at para. 2.9). In Germany non-compliance 
with the CDs can be sanctioned as an administrative offence by the imposition of a fine (Sec. 81 (2) no. 2 lit. 
a, (4) ARC). 
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increases voluntary compliance and therefore facilitates efficient implementation compared 
to IDs.123 Nevertheless, there is a danger of a discrepancy between the commitments agreed 
to on paper and the implementation in practice. More generally, the question arises what role 
the possibility of an effective implementation plays when deciding whether or not to opt for 
IUs, the commitment or the infringement procedure. In how far is the implementation and 
enforceability a criterion for deciding on the enforcement tool?124 The procedural frameworks 
in the MS differ significantly in this regard. 
1. Different Frameworks in Germany and the UK 
In Germany, no particular requirements with regard to the implementation and enforcement 
of CDs can be found. Accordingly, in practice most of the decisions do not explicitly deal 
with the implementation, enforceability, or monitoring of compliance.125 On the contrary, the 
OFT made the possibility to implement commitments efficiently and (if necessary) quickly a 
mandatory requirement of the commitment procedure. It excluded cases in which compliance 
with and the effectiveness of the commitments would be difficult to discern.126 From the 
outset the issue of implementation and monitoring of compliance has to be taken into 
account. In practice, monitoring of compliance is either left to the affected competitors,127 or 
to the undertakings concerned themselves (in form of reporting obligations or the obligation 
to provide information on compliance on request of the competition authority).128 Monitoring 
trustees are not used in the UK practice.129 
                                                
123 DG Competition, March 2014, To commit or not to commit? Deciding between prohibition and 
commitments, p. 3. 
124 This question has to be distinguished form the issue discussed above (supra C.III.3), which is in how far the 
aspired remedy may influence the competition concerns.  
125 One of the exceptions is the decision of the Bundeskartellamt, 17 September 2009, Commitment Decision B 
2 – 90/01-1 – Marketing of Timber, Thüringen, which obligates the undertaking concerned to report on the 
implementation of the commitments and provide certain information to the authority (pp. 7, 8). 
126 OFT, 2004, Enforcement Guidance, at 4.3, 4.5 and A14, A16. 
127 OFT, 24 May 2005, Commitment Decision, No. CA98/03/2005 – TV Eye Limited, at para. 50; OFT, 1 
March 2006, CA98/02/2006, CE/2479/03 – London-wide newspaper distribution, at paras. 104, 105; OFT, 
31 January 2014, Commitment Decision, OFT1514dec – Hotel online booking, at para. 6.17; Ofgem, 
October 2005, Commitment Decision – SP Manweb, at para. 7.6. 
128 OFT, 1 March 2006, CA98/02/2006, CE/2479/03 – London-wide newspaper distribution, at para. 30; OFT, 
31 January 2014, Commitment Decision, OFT1514dec – Hotel online booking, at para. 6.16; Ofgem, 
October 2005, Commitment Decision – SP Manweb, at para. 7.6. 
129 On the contrary, it appears that appointing monitoring trustees is becoming common practice of the 
Commission, see DG Competition, 2012, Antitrust Manual of Proceedings, at paras. 82 et seq.; Yves 
Bottemann and Agapi Patsa, JAE (2013), p. 371, 72. 
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2. Discussion 
Conceptually, the aim of CDs is to balance the loss of procedural safeguards with 
considerations of procedural economy. Therefore, the OFT’s approach to make the adoption 
of CDs dependent on the feasibility of the commitments seems promising. Nevertheless, 
when adopting CDs, safeguards are needed to ensure that the commitments agreed to on 
paper are indeed implemented in practice. At the MS level monitoring is either not dealt with 
at all (Germany) or left to the undertakings concerned by way of reporting obligations (UK). 
Hence, there remains room for stricter procedural designs (e.g. the use of monitoring 
trustees). In order to strengthen the procedural economy of CDs, it has been argued that 
competition authorities should be empowered to reopen proceeding when, contrary to the 
initial conviction, commitments cannot be implemented as effectively as planned.130 This 
leads to the topic of the next section, which is the reopening of commitment procedures. 
VIII. Reopening of the Procedure 
Different from IUs, CDs are binding decisions and the commitment procedure cannot simply 
be reopened at any time. On the other hand, different from the infringement procedure, the 
commitment procedure provides for special provisions governing the reopening of the 
procedure in particular circumstances. The question arises, in how far these provisions are 
exhaustive, and whether the authorities and the undertakings concerned may consensually 
alter or substitute the existing commitments outside the scope of these provisions (1.) This 
question is closely linked to the ‘legal nature’ of CDs, i.e. the ‘ideal conception’ of the 
instrument (2.). 
1. Reopening the Procedure Consensually? 
In the UK, the OFT’s Enforcement Guidance (para. 4.9, A.20) allow for the reopening of the 
proceedings in similar cases as Art. 9 (2) Regulation 1/2003, namely cases of a material 
change of facts, the failure to comply with the commitments, or if the undertakings provided 
incomplete, incorrect, or misleading information. The wording of the Enforcement Guidance 
(“unless”) suggests that the OFT will reopen the proceedings only in the three cases 
mentioned.131 At the same time, the authority may “for the purpose of addressing its current 
                                                
130 Yves Bottemann and Agapi Patsa, JAE (2013), p. 373. 
131 Another related aspect clarified by the OFT’s Enforcement Guidance is the scope of the binding effects of 
commitment decisions. According to the guidance (para. 4.10) the OFT is not prevented from taking action 
in relation to competition concerns which are not addressed by the commitments, e.g. where different aspects 
of an agreement or conduct raise different competition concerns. 
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competition concerns” substitute the original commitments by new commitments or accept a 
variation of the old commitments. 132  Additionally, the authority may release binding 
commitments where it is requested to do so by the persons who offered the commitments, or 
where the competition concerns identified no longer arise.133 In the case of releasing or 
renegotiating commitments third parties have to be consulted.134 
Similarly, in Germany it is well recognized that the catalogue of Art. 32b (2) ARC, which 
establishes similar requirements for the reopening of the procedure as in the UK, can 
generally not be extended to the disadvantage of the undertakings involved and is therefore 
exhaustive. On the other hand, it is widely recognized that the commitment procedure can be 
reopened, even outside the scope of Art. 32b (2) ARC, to the benefit of the undertaking or 
with the undertaking’s consent.135 Arguably, this can already be inferred from the wording of 
Art. 32b (1) ARC, according to which CDs preclude the Bundeskartellamt from taking 
certain measures against the undertakings concerned (the authority will not use its powers 
under Art. 30 (3), 32, 32a ARC) but not from acting to the benefit or with the consent of the 
undertaking.136 
2. Discussion 
Again, with a view to the reopening of the commitment procedure, there is a balance to be 
struck between rule of law values (e.g. legal certainty) on the one hand, and other aims (e.g. 
the flexibility of the procedure) on the other hand. In the UK and Germany commitments may 
be renegotiated, substituted, or released consensually, or to the benefit of the undertakings 
concerned, even outside the explicit provisions governing the reopening of the procedure. 
While a public law interpretation of CDs might suggest that the binding decision can only be 
changed under the conditions provided for by the law, the design of the reopening of the 
commitment procedure in the MS, according to which consensual alteration are basically 
                                                
132 OFT, 2004, Enforcement Guidance, at paras. 4.11, 4.12 and paras. A.18, A.19; see also Sec. 31A (3) CA98. 
If the current competition concerns are different than the ones addressed by the original commitments the 
OFT will take into account the criteria established to assess whether or not it is appropriate to accept binding 
commitments (ibid., at paras. 4.3-4.5). 
133 Ibid., at para. 4.13.  
134 Ibid., at para. 4.23. 
135 Joachim Bornkamm, § 32b GWB, at para. 28; Rainer Bechtold and Wolfgang Bosch, '§ 32b GWB', in Stefan 
Bechtold (ed.), Kartellgesetz, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (7 edn., München 2013), at paras. 
9 f. 
136 On the contrary, pursuant to Art. 9 (1) Regulation 1/2003, a CD generally concludes that “there are no longer 
grounds for action by the Commission“. 
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possible at any time, shows that they are perceived rather as contracts, or some kind of 
‘governance tools’. While this interpretation enhances flexibility, the decision to reopen the 
procedure and to renegotiate commitments might affect not only the consenting undertakings 
concerned but also third parties. Therefore, procedural safeguards are necessary (e.g. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The inquiry confirmed the finding of the Commission (supra A) that – despite a certain level 
of convergence – in Germany and the UK a significant degree of diversity exists with a view 
to the commitment procedure. The remaining differences can be explained by the importance 
attached to different aims and values in the national legal orders. Conceptually, the legal 
framework of CDs should balance the aim of procedural economy with other important aims, 
such as the prevention of ‘instrumental’ competition law enforcement by the authorities. In 
the light of a reduced standard of judicial control it has been argued that rather strict 
procedural designs are preferable.  
At this abstract level, a counter argument could be that a stricter procedural design 
jeopardizes the benefits of the instrument, especially procedural economy and flexibility. For 
example, it has been argued that the commitment procedure is especially well-suited for 
contexts where regulators and firms are confronted with considerable uncertainty and for 
volatile market environments.137 In this context, the commitment procedure is perceived as a 
“policy-learning device”138 that makes the undertakings concerned, which are potentially 
most knowledgeable about the market and the issue at hand, primarily responsible for 
proposing and adjusting remedies.139 At first glance, this interpretation seems to conflict with 
the view taken above that the stricter approach in the OFT’s Enforcement Guidance towards 
the scope of application of the commitment procedure is worthwhile, which is especially the 
exclusion of cases characterised by a high level of uncertainty (supra II.4).  
Yet, setting higher standards as to the applicability of CDs to cases characterised by 
uncertainty might not even contradict the aim of ‘joint learning’. With a view to factual 
uncertainty, no conflict arises as long as one agrees that a ‘trial and error’ approach – where 
                                                
137 Yane Svetiev, Settling or Learning Through Commitment Decisions? (forthcoming), p. 27. The importance of 
this role of CDs supposedly results from the transformation of EU competition law – most importantly the 
so-called “more economic approach” (MEA) and the shift from a rather “form-based” to a more “effects-
based” approach. The consequences of the perceived transformation of competition law and policy, which 
are often labelled as “more regulatory and forward-looking”, “focusing on effects and context”, “greater use 
of economic analysis”, and related to an increasing “volatility of market environments”, and the “multiplicity 
of policy objectives”, are found to be a higher amount of uncertainty. Ibid., at 6 et seq., 11.: “[…] once the 
form based policy is abandoned, novel tools of implementation must be understood through this prism […]”. 
On the contrary, Heike Schweitzer, Zur Bedeutung des „More Economic Approach“ für die Unionsgerichte, 
speech as part of an expert forum at the ECJ, 2012, p. 16, argued that the frequent use of CDs might as well 
be seen as a way to circumvent rather then implementing the more demanding requirement of the MEA. The 
use of the commitment procedure to quickly terminate proceedings without establishing a fully developed 
theory of harm based on an in-depth inquiry into the facts might actually contradict the aim of the MEA, 
which is to focus on conduct only that (potentially) has detrimental effects on the process of competition, and 
accordingly the increased requirements to proof an infringement of competition law. 
138 Yane Svetiev, Settling or Learning Through Commitment Decisions?, p. 1. 
139 Ibid., at 3, 15. 
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the initial attempt to solve the competition concerns is not based on an informed and 
reasonable decision – would be undesirable.140 Setting limits as to the amount of uncertainty 
CDs may be based on does not mean that it should be impossible to include review clauses or 
fixed timeframes for reassessing the effectiveness of commitments. Learning and adjustment 
does not have to be exempted from the commitment procedure. Moreover, formalising the 
procedure might in fact facilitate ‘collaborative learning’. For example, compared to a 
situation where undertakings are forced to negotiate commitments based on very limited 
information and a vague theory of harm, creating more formal rules for the negotiation 
process that enhance transparency, might facilitate the proper identification of the competition 
concerns and the joint development of appropriate solutions. Hence, the seemingly hostile 
perceptions of the commitment procedure might – at least to a certain extend – be 
reconcilable. On the other hand, excluding cases of legal uncertainty is justified by 
institutional reasons. The development of legal doctrine is the task of the courts rather than 
market participants and competition authorities. 
While so far the different procedural designs were compared in order to identify the kind of 
ex-ante safeguards that are best suited to mitigate limited ex-post judicial control, the next 
section takes a closer look at the CD-policies applied by the NCAs. How much self-restraint 
of competition authorities can be found in practice? 
  
                                                
140 Ibid., at 25. 
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D. Commitment Decision Policies in Germany and the UK 
In the light of the combination of a reduced level of judicial control and limited procedural 
restraints, concerns have been raised as to the wide margin of policy discretion of the 
Commission, and the lack of self-restraint when adopting CDs.141 In fact, from entering into 
force of Regulation 1/2003 in May 2004 to date a significant shift in the Commission’s 
enforcement policy can be identified, in the course of which the instrument of CDs has 
become the most frequently used tool outside the area of cartels.142  
Procedural efficiency is often mentioned as an important driver for this trend.143 The potential 
to resolve competition concerns quickly is, arguably, one of the key advantages of the 
commitment procedure. However, comparing the time frame between the opening of the 
proceeding and the adoption of a decision it can be seen that much depends on the legal basis 
of the CDs: looking at the total of adopted decisions, infringement procedures took in fact 
17 % longer than commitment procedures; conversely, in Art. 102 TFEU-cases (where CDs 
are used frequently) commitment procedures were 15 % slower than infringement 
procedures.144 This is to say that the aspect of procedural efficiency of CDs is not as ‘self-
evident’ as it might seem.145 Hence, there might be additional driving forces behind the trend 
towards more ‘consensual competition law’. 
Another striking fact in relation to the Commission’s practice is that while to date all 
remedies under Art. 7 Regulation 1/2003 have been of behavioural nature, under Art. 9 
Regulation 1/2003 also structural remedies have been adopted.146 In this context it is further 
interesting to note that a major focus of the CD-practice was on the energy sector,147 an area 
                                                
141 Heike Schweitzer, (2012), Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States, p. 5 et seq. 
142 Commission, 9 July 2014, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, at para. 185. 
Looking at the total numbers, including cartel cases which fall outside of the scope of application of CDs, 
IDs remain the most important enforcement tool with 78 decisions compared to 33 CDs since May 2004 
(para. 184); Mario Mariniello, Commitments or Prohibition? The EU Antitrust Dilemma, Bruegel Policy 
Brief, 01 iss., January 2014, p. 6. 
143 Commission, 9 July 2014, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, at paras. 187, 189. 
144 Mario Mariniello, (January 2014), p. 4, 5. 
145 On the contrary, Niamh Dunne, Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Law, Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics, 2014, finds that the commitment procedure is “self-evidently” quicker and cheaper (p. 7) and 
that the procedural economy advantages are “indisputable” (p. 35). It could be argued that one should take as 
a starting point for measuring the length of the procedure not the opening of the procedure but an earlier 
stage, e.g. the first complaint, and as the end point not the adoption of the decision but the implementation of 
the decision and the effects on the market. Nevertheless, the comparison of the infringement and the 
commitment procedure shows that the procedural efficiency of CDs may change from case to case and is not 
as self-evident as often suggested. 
146 Commission, 9 July 2014, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, at para. 188. 
147 One third (11 out of 33) of the Commission’s CDs have been passed in the energy sector, ibid., at para. 186. 
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that was recently subject to a sector inquiry of the Commission and (legislative) liberalisation 
efforts.148 Moreover, many of the CDs that applied structural remedies were passed in the 
energy sector.149  
The practice of the Commission is subject to concerns and criticism: Some commentators that 
analysed the practice of the Commission identified a paradigm shift towards more 
‘regulatory’ antitrust enforcement.150 It has been observed that the Commissions tends to 
make far-reaching commitments binding, which potentially exceed the objectives of 
protecting and restoring the competitive process so as to implement certain visions of the 
Commission concerning the structuring and functioning of markets.151 Another strategy that 
has been identified is to use CDs as a substitute for granting conditional exemptions under the 
former notification system in order to pursue own competition policy objectives.152 Again, 
chances are that the policy pursued exceeds the mandate to protect the process of undistorted 
competition.153 In sum, there seems to be a danger that CDs are not only used to benefit from 
procedural economy, but to pursue policies that could not be implemented via traditional 
enforcement tools. 
                                                
148 Commission, 10 January 2007, Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the 
European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report). Generally on the liberalisation of the energy sector see 
only http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/overview_en.html (last accessed 22 July 2014). 
149 Commission, 9 July 2014, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, fn. 268 mentions 
CDs were structural remedies were applied and most of them were passed in the energy sector. 
150 Damien Gerard, Negotiated remedies in the modernization era: the limits of effectiveness, p. 3, 18 et seq.; 
Niamh Dunne, JCLE (2014), p. 13 et seq. 
151 Hubertus von Rosenberg, Unbundling through the Back Door… the case of network divestiture as a remedy 
in the energy sector, European Competition Law Review, 5 iss., 2009; Malgorzata Sadowska and Bert 
Willems, Power Markets Shaped by Antitrust, European Competition Journal, 9 vol., 1 iss., 2013; Florian 
Wagner-von Papp, CML Rev. (2012), p. 960 et seq. 
152 Heike Schweitzer, Verpflichtungszusagen im Gemeinschaftsrecht, p. 648; Heike Schweitzer, (2012), 
Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States, p. 15. 
153 In this context, George Stephanov Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency: The Growing Reliance on U.S.-Style 
Antitrust Settlements in EU Law, Utah Law Review, 4 iss., 2007, p. 1033 talks about a “loophole in the EU 
antitrust systeme”. On the contrary, while the DG Competition stresses in its internal Antitrust Manual of 
Procedures that the misuse of commitment decisions by undertakings as a “notification through the back 
door” has to be avoided (DG Competition, 2012, Antitrust Manual of Proceedings, mod. 16 para. 16), there is 
no equivalent concern raised against a potential misuse by the Commission itself, using the instrument as a 
competition policy tool. See also Nicolas Petit, 17 June 2011, Chillin'Competition, The Perverse Effects of 
the Court’s Ruling in Tele2 Polska, who argues that due to internal incentive structures of the Commission 
case officers rather translate cases which are found to have no merits “into some sort of observable decisional 
output” via CDs than dropping the case, as they are not able to pass a decision that there is no infringement. 
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While it would go beyond the scope of this study to analyse the Commission’s CD-practice 
more closely, it is against the background of these concerns that the practice in Germany and 
the UK will be explored in detail.  
Looking at the overall numbers in 
the MS, it can already be seen that 
CDs have become an important 
enforcement tool at national level, 
accounting for 23 % of all 
envisaged decisions by NCAs 
between May 2004 and December 
2013. 154  Moreover, looking in 
detail at the numbers in Germany 
and the UK reveals that CDs have 
become the prime tool of 
competition law enforcement 
outside (and in Germany even 
overall) the area of hardcore cartel 
conduct. At national level as well 
CDs have been used most often in 
the energy sector.155 
Comparing the approximate length of commitment and infringement procedures in Germany 
and the UK shows that the element of procedural efficiency is important but should not be 
overstated. Again, much depends on the provision in question:156 Looking at the total 
numbers in Germany IDs took approx. 30 months while CDs took only 22 months. In the UK 
on the other hand, IDs took approx. 29 months, while CDs took 35 months; thus CDs took 
even more time than IDs. In cases of Art. 81 EC/Art. 101 TFEU/national equivalents in 
Germany CDs were faster, while in the UK IDs were quicker. In cases of Art. 82 EC/Art. 102 
                                                
154 Commission, 9 July 2014, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, at para. 196. 
155 Ibid., at para. 196. This is true also for the UK (2 out of 7) and Germany (62 out of 77). In Germany this is 
especially striking as at the same time only a small number of the IDs that were issued were passed in the 
energy sector (4 out of 53). 
156 The numbers are only a rough estimate comparing the first reported date of the procedure (e.g. first 
complaint) with the issuance of the final decision. Sometimes no exact dates but e.g. only the month the 
procedure started have been reported. Furthermore, the duration of one month has been defined as 
approximately 29,6 days. Hardcore cartel conduct has been excluded, which is why especially in the UK the 
















TFEU/national equivalents on the other hand, in Germany and in the UK CDs were faster 
(opposite to the findings at Union level). In Germany cases that were based on both legal 
foundations CDs were slower (while in the UK no ID was based on both foundations). Again, 
the message here is that the procedural efficiency of CDs might not be as obvious as one 
might think, and therefore, also at national level, might not be the only driving force behind 
the trend towards a more ‘consensual competition law’. 
 
Against this background this section analyses the practice of the NCAs in Germany (II.) and 
the UK (III.) in order to answer the following questions: What kind of strategies do the NCAs 
apply when using CDs? In the light of the criticism of the Commission’s CDs practice, is 
there more self-restraint to be found at national level, which limits the use of CDs to pursue 
the major aim of procedural economy while at the same time avoiding ‘instrumental’ 
competition law enforcement? The ‘experiments’ of various competition authorities with 
different enforcement strategies within the federal enforcement regime of the EU facilitates 
reciprocal learning, and the following comparative study is supposed to help improving the 
use of ‘consensual’ competition law enforcement in Europe. 
I. Enforcement Strategies of the Bundeskartellamt 
In Germany two main strategies can be distinguished when it comes to the use of CDs: First, 
using the commitment procedure to quickly implement findings of IDs and corresponding 
decisions of the courts (1.). Following this strategy, in terms of content, CDs correspond to 
IDs. On the contrary, the second strategy is to make use of the distinct characteristics of the 
commitment procedure in order to achieve results that might not be attained in the same way 
by IDs (2.).  
















1. Following Infringement Decisions 
One strategy of the BK that can be identified is to use IDs and corresponding (full) judicial 
review as model cases for subsequently adopted CDs:  
In several cases, concerning the foreclosure of gas markets by way of long-term supply 
contracts between gas transmission companies and distributors, the BK used an infringement 
procedure against the E.ON Ruhrgas AG and corresponding judicial control of the Higher 
Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht (OLG)) Düsseldorf, which upheld the ID, 157  as an 
exemplary legal proceeding (“Musterverfahren”158). The findings of this proceeding were 
used and implemented later in similar cases via CDs.159  
In other cases, concerning an alleged abuse of a dominant position of municipal grid 
companies by charging excessive concession fees, the ID and corresponding court 
proceedings did not predate the CDs, but the latter were subject to the condition that the 
courts (e.g. when dealing with a similar ID) do not set aside the legal analysis of the BK.160 
Finally, the court confirmed the legal assessment of the BK.161 
In both cases the BK combined the benefits of the commitment and the infringement 
procedure – full inquiry into the facts and full judicial control of controversial legal questions 
on the one hand, and cooperation with the undertakings concerned and evasion of costly and 
time consuming procedures, on the other hand. In these cases the content or at least the 
overall aim of the decisions created by the different enforcement tools were similar.  
2. Utilising Distinct Features of the Commitment Procedure 
On the contrary, in several cases CDs issued by the BK deviate from IDs issued in similar 
cases or at least show some distinct characteristics that seem to be related to the nature of the 
enforcement tool. More precisely, the BK seems to have used this more consensual 
                                                
157 OLG Düsseldorf, 04 October 2007, NJOZ 2008, 891 = WuWE DE-R 219 – E.ON Ruhrgas AG. 
158 Bundeskartellamt, 22 June 2009, Activity Report 2007/2008, pp. 113 et seq. 
159 Bundeskartellamt, 8 October 2007, Commitment Decision B8-113-03-3 – Verbundnetz Gas AG; 
Bundeskartellamt, 10 October 2007, Commitment Decision B8-113-03-10 – E.ON Avacon AG; 
Bundeskartellamt, 06 February 2008, Commitment Decision B8-113-03-12 – Erdgasversorgungsgesellschaft 
Thüringen-Sachsen; Bundeskartellamt, 18 February 2008, Commitment Decision B8-113-03-9 – EWE AG; 
Bundeskartellamt, 07 August 2008, Commitment Decision B8-113-03-2 – RWE AG and RWE Energy AG. 
The decision of the OLG Düsseldorf was, however, criticised for not finding that the ID was disproportionate 
and therefore also the CDs might in fact be problematic, despite alignment with the infringement procedure 
(for further discussion see infra D.I.2.a). 
160 Bundeskartellamt, 03 June 2009, Commitment Decision B10-71/08 – GGEW, at para. 7; Bundeskartellamt, 
17 September 2009, Commitment Decision B10-74/08 – Stadtwerke Torgau GmbH, at para. 14. 
161 See Bundeskartellamt, 29 May 2013, Activity Report 2011/2012, BT-Druck. 17/13675, pp. 102, 103. 
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enforcement tool in order to (a.) shape market structures, (b.) prevent future harm, (c.) 
implement sector inquires and substitute regulation, (d.) coordinate ‘shared regulatory space’, 
(e.) substitute conditional exemptions, (f.) experiment in fast developing markets, or (g.) in 
order to complement merger procedures.  
a) Shaping Market Structures 
One distinct characteristic of the CDs practice of the BK seems to be that the tool is 
frequently used to change the structure of markets. Moreover, in some cases the commitment 
procedure deviated from the remedies applied via IDs in that it was used to undertake 
interventions into the market that exceed the aim of bringing an alleged infringement of 
competition law to an end. The following three examples illustrate this strategy. 
aa) Example: Excessive Prices for Heating Current 
A first example is presented by a number of CDs in the electricity sector, which dealt with 
excessive pricing practices of undertakings supplying heating current for night storage heaters 
and heat pumps. The authority conducted an analysis of the prices based on the ‘Comparable 
Market Concept’ (‘Vergleichsmarktkonzept’), comparing the prices of the undertakings with 
those of comparable undertakings in different geographic markets.162 According to the BK, 
the undertakings abused their dominant positions, which were inter alia based on entry 
barriers to the market:163  
In its sector inquiry the BK identified the following different types of entry barriers: Most 
importantly, due to the lack of regulation or a dominant industry standard, network operators 
applied differing load profiles, which made it very difficult or even impossible for alternative 
providers to offer standardised supply of heating current to end-consumers. Furthermore, the 
network operators were not bound by any transparency obligations regarding their load 
profiles. Secondly, a major entry barrier resulted from the manifold and non-transparent range 
of products, which made it impossible for alternative providers to calculate and design 
competing products. Thirdly, many incumbents engaged in below-cost pricing. Fourthly, 
many municipal incumbents were able to demand excessive concession fees from 
independent suppliers as well as their own heating current providers, as they could 
compensate higher costs with the increased returns on concession fees.  
                                                
162 Bundeskartellamt, September 2010, Sector Inquiry (Heating Current), "Sektorenuntersuchung Heizstrom, 
Marktüberblick und Verfahren", pp. 12 et seq.  
163 Ibid., pp. 7 et seq. 
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In September 2009 the BK initiated proceedings against 19 heating current providers, 18 of 
which have been closed in reaction to commitments of the undertakings concerned (13 formal 
CDs pursuant to § 32b ARC, 1 informal commitment, and 4 case closures),164 and one of 
which was subject to an ID.165 The different outcomes of the infringement procedure, on the 
one hand, and the commitments, on the other hand, are striking: While the ID was limited to 
addressing the competition concerns at hand, the CDs adopted additional measures that aimed 
at the ex ante opening of the market:  
Both types of decisions adopted certain financial obligations. The ID obligated the 
undertaking to refund the excessive payments (including interests) to consumers.166 The CDs 
correspond to this in that they made different commitments of the undertakings concerned 
binding, which led to a relief of the financial burden of consumers (e.g. refunds to customers 
or deferral or renunciation of price increases, which would have been appropriate with a view 
to increased costs). Additionally, the CDs include so-called “no-repeat-game”-clauses, which 
ensure that the undertakings will not compensate for these financial reliefs by future 
countermeasures (e.g. price increases). At the same time, the undertakings agreed to charge 
their customers only a certain, comparably low rate for heating current.  
In addition to these financial measures, the undertakings “made a significant contribution to 
remove entry barriers to the markets for heating current.”167 The undertakings committed to 
various far-reaching measures, particularly to increase transparency (e.g. to publish their 
tariffs on the internet) and to apply a specific standardized procedure to develop load profiles 
(which also have to be published online).168 It was the declared aim of the authority, when 
making the commitments binding, to not only address the alleged price abuses but, moreover, 
to reduce entry barriers to the markets by applying ‘quasi-structural’ remedies (i.e. 
behavioural remedies with structural effects).169 The president of the BK further pointed out 
that this would probably not have been achieved with conventional orders to bring the 
infringement to an end.170 Hence, this is a clear case where the authority took the (potential) 
                                                
164 For a list of all the cases closed in reaction to commitments undertakings see ibid., annex pp. 1-3.  
165 Bundeskartellamt, 19 March 2012, Decision B10-16/09 – ENTEGA Privatkunden GmbH & Co. KG. 
166 Ibid., paras. 2 et seq. 
167 Bundeskartellamt, September 2010, Sector Inquiry (Heating Current), p. 16 (translated from German to 
English). The same language can be found in the individual CDs, see e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 29 October 
2010, Commitment Decision B10-22/09 – RWE Vertrieb AG, para. 27. 
168 Bundeskartellamt, September 2010, Sector Inquiry (Heating Current), p. 16. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Andreas Mundt, (2011), Alternative Instrumente der Kartellbehörden p. 10. 
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infringement of competition law as an opportunity to undertake additional market corrections 
via CDs that exceed the mere aim of bringing the infringement to an end.  
bb) Example: Foreclosure of Gas Markets via Long-Term Supply Contracts 
A second example for the importance of designing the market structure as a basis for CDs are 
the cases already mentioned above, concerning the foreclosure of gas markets by way of long-
term supply contracts between gas transmission companies and distributors (supra D.I.1). 
While these were proceedings where the CDs actually followed an ID and a corresponding 
decision of the court, they nevertheless show a tendency towards designing the market and the 
commercial relations between market participants rather than being limited to bringing an 
infringement of competition law to an end. This is why the corresponding decision of the 
OLG Düsseldorf has been criticised heavily.171 
In these cases the BK was concerned about the combination of long-term purchase obligations 
and the high proportion of actual annual demand covered in gas supply contracts, and argued 
that these potentially infringe Art. 81, 82 EC (Art. 101, 102 TFEU) and Sec. 1 ARC. In 
consequence, the undertakings committed to close contracts (concerning a minimum total 
demand of 250 GWh/year) that covered more than 50-80 % of the prospective total annual 
demand for a maximum term of four years, and contracts covering more than 80 % of the total 
annual demand for a maximum term of two years. President Mundt emphasised the 
importance of the industry-wide solution as an essential impulse for the opening of the gas 
markets.172 Hence, apart from the solution of the competition concerns in the individual cases, 
the overall structure of the industry seems to have played an important role.  
It was criticised – also with a view to the decision of the OLG Düsseldorf – that the remedies 
are not limited to the prohibition of certain long-term contracts to address the foreclosure of 
the market, but additionally specify the permissible design of future agreements, in order to 
facilitate entry of third parties into the market.173 A further criticism has been made that the 
remedies prohibit the combination of contracts with different durations and different 
proportions of actual annual demand covered. Thus, if a contract covering 20 % of the 
demand with a term of four years has been closed, the companies are not allowed to close 
                                                
171 Thomas Dreher, Die Beschränkung der Vertragsabschlussfreiheit durch kartellbehördliche Verfügung, 
Behördliche Wettbewerbsbeteiligungsverbote für Energielieferverträge?, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 
2008, p. 1557. 
172 Andreas Mundt, (2011), Alternative Instrumente der Kartellbehörden p. 9. 
173 Thomas Dreher, NJW (2008), p. 1557. 
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another contract in year three or four with a term of two years covering 65 % of the 
demand.174 Supposedly, this prevents the remedies from being circumvented. It has, however, 
been argued that while the authority is allowed to prevent the remedies from being 
circumvented, it is not allowed to generally prohibit exclusivity contracts, or make specific 
limits regarding the combination of the term of the contract and the demand covered 
compulsory for undertakings, irrespective of the existence of a market foreclosure.175 In sum, 
it was criticised that the decisions are not limited to defining and addressing the distortion of 
competition, but instead are used to design the competitive process itself.176  
Following this line of argument (against the view of the OLG Düsseldorf), the remedies of the 
ID – and therefore also the commitments – exceed what is necessary to re-establish 
compliance with the rules infringed. As has been argued above (supra C.III.1), a stricter 
design of the negotiation process might have led to a very different outcome. 
In this context it is further remarkable, that the BK in its report on the evaluation of the 
decisions came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to extend the duration of the 
commitments, as the market conditions generally improved – also due to new regulatory 
instruments – and because the authority did not expect these developments to revert without 
further binding commitments.177 Once again, there seems to be a strong focus on the design of 
efficient markets, and the protection of future market conditions. 
cc) Example: Marketing of Media Rights 
A third possible example for the way CDs are used by the BK to shape efficient markets 
(instead of being confined to eliminating infringements of competition law by preserving the 
market structure) is a decision of the BK adopted in January 2012. The CD was issued to 
terminate a procedure concerning the central marketing of media rights by the League 
Association (“Die Liga – Fußballverband e.V.”) in respect of matches in the first 
(“Bundesliga”) and second (“2. Bundesliga”) national football division.178 Potentially, this 
                                                
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid., at 1560, 61. 
176 Ibid., at 1558. 
177 Bundeskartellamt, 15 June 2010, Bericht über die Evaluierung der Beschlüsse zu langfristigen 
Gaslieferverträgen, at p. 6 et seq. 
178 Bundeskartellamt, 12 January 2012, Commitment Decision B 6-114/10 – Bundesliga. The licensed clubs and 
companies in the first and second national football divisions (the clubs) are the members of the League 
Association, which is the sole shareholder in “Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH” (DFL), which conducts the 
operational business of the League Association. The League Association is a registered association and 
ordinary member of the German Football Association (Deutscher Fußballbund (DFB)). The clubs are not 
direct members of the DFB. According to the DFB's articles of incorporation, the League Association is 
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central marketing of media rights infringes Art. 101 TFEU and Sec. 1 ARC by restricting 
competition between the clubs, between the clubs and the League Association and also by 
restricting the economic freedom of third parties such as customers of media rights.179 
However, the BK found that the central marketing of media rights enables qualitative 
improvements of the product, measured in terms of preferences of the consumers, such as the 
preference of reports on the football division as a whole and not only on games of a certain 
club. It could therefore not be ruled out that the prerequisites for the exemptions pursuant to 
Art. 101 (3) TFEU and Sec. 2 ARC are met.180 Moreover, the BK found it was not necessary 
to make use of its powers under Sec. 32, 32a ARC as long the media rights are distributed in a 
marketing model, which makes the efficiencies accessible to the consumers.181 It therefore 
made commitments binding according to which the media rights have to be sold in packages 
and according to a specific marketing model.182 
It remains questionable whether similar remedies could have been applied in this case by 
using the infringement procedure. Arguably, the decision is not designed to bring an 
infringement of competition law effectively to an end but rather to implement a certain vision 
of efficient market structures.  
With a view to the theory of harm, it is highly controversial in how far the central marketing 
of media rights infringes competition law: Some commentators find the infringement of 
competition law by the joint selling of media rather obvious.183 Others, however, raise serious 
doubts regarding the infringement, as the clubs are necessarily forced to cooperate to market 
the media rights. 184 In every single game there are at least two clubs involved and many more 
                                                                                                                                                   
entitled to organise league football competitions leased by the DFB and to exploit them exclusively in its 
own name (see paras. 1-4 of the CD). 
179 Ibid. at paras. 25 et seq. 
180 Ibid. at para. 25.  
181 Ibid. at para. 89. 
182 Ibid. at para. 109, as well as the annex. 
183 See e.g. Thomas Körber, Die erstmalige Anwendung der Verpflichtungszusage gemäß Art. 9 VO1/2003 und 
die Zukunft der Zentralvermarktung von Medienrechten an der Fußballbundesliga, Wettbewerb in Recht und 
Praxis, 4 iss., 2005, p. 465. 
184 See (regarding CDs of the Commission, 23 July 2003, Commitment Decision, COMP/C.2/37.398 – Joint 
Selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League; Commission, 19 January 2005, 
Commitment Decision, COMP/37.214 – Bundesliga; Commission, 22 March 2006, Commitment Decision, 
COMP/C.2/38.173 – Joint selling of the media rights of the FA Premier League on which the BK based its 
decision) Hans-Joachim Hellmann and Stefan Bruder, Kartellrechtliche Grundsätze der zentralen 
Vermarktung von Sportveranstaltungen - Die aktuelle Entscheidungen der Kommission zur Bundesliga und 
FA Premier League, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2006, p. 361, 62. 
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with a view to the league as a whole. Hence, the commitments were based on a contentious 
theory of harm. 
Additionally, regarding the remedies made binding in the CDs, it has been argued that they 
rather aimed at introducing competition into a market that has a clear tendency towards a 
monopoly (‘premium content bottleneck’) than addressing anti-competitive conduct of the 
undertakings.185 Arguably, the obligation to sell media rights in packages is neither an 
appropriate means to tackle the restriction of output, nor the problem of price fixing, which 
both are potential horizontal effects of the joint selling of the media rights.186 Alternatively, 
the authority could have dealt with these problems e.g. by requiring the associations to expand 
their output or to prohibit excessive prices. It is questionable whether these remedies would 
have been available in the infringement procedure, as it would be disproportionate to create 
rivalry by means of competition law instead of tackling the concrete anti-competitive conduct 
while accepting the features of the market – even if it is the tendency towards a monopoly.187 
In sum, these CDs concerning the marketing of media rights are another example for the way 
controversial competition concerns can still trigger far-reaching commitments that 
substantially change the structure and the functioning of markets in a way that might not be 
possible via unilateral IDs,188 and without providing clear precedents.  
b) Preventing Future Harm 
Another distinct feature of the CDs practice of the BK is the frequently pursued aim to avoid 
future infringements of competition law. It is a balancing act to identify the tipping point 
between permissible and impermissible remedies: they must aim at restoring the competitive 
process, and prevent the circumvention of corresponding prohibitions,189 rather than designing 
                                                
185 This criticism has been raised again with a view to CDs of the Commissions (Fn. 184) by Pablo Ibánez 
Colomo, On the Application of Competition Law as Reguation: Elements for a Theory, p. 290, 91. 
186 Ibid. 
187 On the contrary, others argue that the central marketing of media rights should be totally banned. See e.g. 
Thomas Körber, WRP (2005), p. 465 et seq. 
188 John Temple Lang, 'Commitment Decisions Under Regulation 1/2003', in Charles Gheur and Nicolas Petit 
(eds.), Alternative Enforcement Techniques in EC Competition Law – Settlements, commitments and other 
novel instruments (Brussels 2009), p. 122. 
189 Undertaking cannot only be prohibited to continue the infringement but also to conduct similar practices in 
the future, CFI, 6 October 1994, Case T-83/91, ECR 1994 II-755 – Tetra Pak, at para. 220. However, the 
Commission may only prohibit to continue certain conduct in the future or to involve in similar practices, 
when it has been shown that this behaviour actually infringes competition law. Thus, the courts have set aside 
the prohibition of all future exclusivity agreements, because this prohibition also included lawful exclusivity 
agreements (CFI, 8 June 1995, Case T-7/93, ECR 1995 II-1533 – Langnese-Iglo); they have set aside the 
prohibition of certain service contracts which themselves did not infringe competition law, also because the 
Commission did not sufficiently justify the prohibition (CFI, 28 February 2002, Case T-395/94, ECR 2002 
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the competitive process and preventing potential future harm, without being (remotely) linked 
to an past- or on-going infringement of competition law.190 The more remedies focus on 
potential future infringements, the more proactive competition law becomes, and the more it 
departs from the traditional retrospective approach to pursue the “re-establishment of 
compliance with the rules infringed”191. 
One example, were the BK might have overstepped the dividing line, are the cases discussed 
above concerning the foreclosure of gas markets via long-term supply contracts (supra a)bb)). 
The approach of the BK, to make a certain contractual design obligatory instead of 
prohibiting the specific contracts in question, aimed at preventing the remedies from being 
circumvented in the future by different contractual designs. However, it has been criticised 
that these obligations went too far in that they were not limited to defining and addressing the 
distortion of competition but instead were used to design the competitive process itself.192 
Another example, where the prevention of future harm was a central aim, and were the BK’s 
president Mundt emphasised the “protecting character for the future”193 of the commitments 
that were made binding, were cases concerning the pricing practice of several gas suppliers. 
In 2008 the authority examined whether the gas prices charged by the undertakings concerned 
differed considerably from those of comparable undertakings in other geographic markets. 
The undertakings were suspected of charging excessive prices in 2007 and 2008 in the 
markets for the supply of household and commercial customers with heating gas.194 In formal 
                                                                                                                                                   
II-875 – Atlantic Container Line, at paras. 410 et seq.); and they have set aside the prohibition of the 
exchange of statistical data, as the Commission only found that this exchange might possibly be used for 
anticompetitive purposes (CFI, 14 May 1998, Case T-310/94, ECR 1998 II-1043 – Gruber + Weber, at paras. 
177, 178). 
190 While fines generally aim at deterring future competition law infringements (by the undertaking concerned 
but also other firms) the application of remedies primarily aims at restoring the competitive process, Per 
Hellstrom, Frank Maier-Rigaud, and Friedrich Wenzel Bulst, (2009-2010), ALJ, p. 45. 
191 ECJ, 6 April 1995, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, ECR 1995 I-743 – RTE and ITP (Magill), at 
para. 93. 
192 Thomas Dreher, NJW (2008), p. 1558; see also supra D.II.1.b)aa)(2). 
193 Andreas Mundt, (2011), Alternative Instrumente der Kartellbehörden p. 9, 10. 
194 The proceedings concerning 2007 were based on § 19 ARC (prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position) 
and the proceedings concerning 2008 were based on the new § 29 ARC, which was applied for the first time 
and which makes it easier for competition authorities to prosecute excessive pricing in the electricity and gas 
markets. See Bundeskartellamt, 01 October 2011, Activity Report 2008, short version (English), pp. 25 et 
seq.; Bundeskartellamt, 22 June 2009, Activity Report 2007/2008, pp. 114, 115. Out of the 33 cases under 
investigation, 17 were closed after “informal commitments” were accepted, 14 were closed pursuant to 
Sec. 32b ARC, and 2 were dropped without adopting a formal decision (see Sec. 62 (2) ARC), ibid., pp. 117 
et seq. The following cases were closed pursuant to § 32b ARC with a view to excessive pricing: 
Bundeskartellamt, 01 December 2008, Commitment Decision B10-38/08 – Bad-Honnef AG; 
Bundeskartellamt, 01 December 2008, Commitment Decision B10-41/08 – Thüga AG; Bundeskartellamt, 01 
December 2008, Commitment Decision B10-21/08 – RheinEnergie AG; Bundeskartellamt, 01 Dedember 
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commitment procedures the undertakings concerned committed to bonus payments to their 
customers, to the reduction of prices, to the deferral of price increases, and abstained from 
passing on the increase in gas purchasing costs as well as refrained from compensating for the 
price cuts with subsequent price measures (“no-repeat-game-clauses”).195  
The BK explained the willingness of the undertakings to compromise and offer these far-
reaching commitments inter alia with the authority’s (supposedly) extended powers, such as 
the power to adopt positive operative provisions in its decisions (“positive Tenorierung”196), 
which the authority is able to use in order to negotiate (even more) far-reaching 
commitments.197 Using alternative enforcement scenarios as a tool to negotiate commitments 
does not appear illegitimate per se. Yet, this is only true as long as these alternative scenarios 
are in fact covered by the powers of the authority (which might be difficult to assess given the 
limited information provided in the preliminary assessment of the case). Contrary to the view 
of the BK, according to which the powers of the authority have been extended by the 
introduction of the instrument of “positive Tenorierung”, it has e.g. been argued that as 
before, the authority may adopt positive obligations only in cases where there is just one 
possible conduct that can bring the infringement to an end.198 Arguably, otherwise it would be 
                                                                                                                                                   
2008, Commitment Decision B10-34/08 – Stadtwerke Düsseldorf AG; Bundeskartellamt, 01 December 2008, 
Commitment Decision B10-25/08 – MITGAS Mitteldeutsche Gasversorgung GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 2. 
December 2008, Commitment Decision B10-36/08 – Süwag Energie AG (Gas Prices); Bundeskartellamt, 01 
December 2008, Commitment Decision B10/51/08 – Energie SaarLorLux; Bundeskartellamt, 01 December 
2008, Commitment Decision B10-22/08 – Stadtwerke Karlsruhe GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 01 December 
2008, Commitment Decision B10-43/08 – EVL Energieversrogung Limburg GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 01 
December 2008, Commitment Decision B10-18/08 – Harz Energie GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 01 December 
2008, Commitment Decision B10-47/08 – Energieversorgung Gera GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 01 December 
2008, Commitment Decision B10-33/08 – Stadtwerke Homburg GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 01 December 
2008, Commitment Decision B10-55/08 – Gas-Versorgungsbetriebe Cottbus GmbH. 
195 Interestingly, in its activity report the BK mentions an informal proceeding, in which the undertaking 
concerned further committed to far-reaching positive transparency obligations, such as publishing a map of 
gas grids in Berlin to facilitate market entry of third parties, Bundeskartellamt, 22 June 2009, Activity Report 
2007/2008, p.118. 
196 While the power to adopt positive obligations to do certain acts or provide certain services (“positive 
Tenorierung”) was introduced to German competition law only in 2005 in reaction to Art. 5 Regulation 
1/2003, the Commission used such remedies already before, Volker Emmerich, '§ 32 GWB', in Ulrich 
Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (eds.), Wettbewerbsrecht, GWB, Kommentar zum Deutschen 
Kartellrecht (4 edn., 2 vol. 2007), at para. 34. However, positive obligations are only permissible to 
effectively restore the competitive process and limited by the contractual freedom of the undertakings 
concerned, which is that whenever there is more than only one possible way of bringing the infringement 
equally effective to an end, it has to be the undertaking rather than the competition authority to make the 
choice, CFI, 18 September 1992, Case T-24/90, ECR 1992 II-2223 – Automec, at paras. 51, 52. 
197 Bundeskartellamt, 22 June 2009, Activity Report 2007/2008, p.117. 
198 Thomas Dreher, NJW (2008), p. 1558. 
 60 
an inappropriate interference with the freedom of contract of the undertakings concerned.199 
Hence, there is a certain risk that the authority interprets its powers in the infringement 
procedure extensively and based on this interpretation negotiates even more extensive 
remedies in the commitment procedure, using positive obligations to prevent potential future 
harm to the competitive process. 
c) Implementing Findings of Sector Inquiries 
Another major concern that has been raised with a view to CDs practice in the EU is that the 
instrument may become a substitute for regulation by implementing policies or specific 
visions of market structures centrally defined by the Commission by the way of sector 
inquiries.200 At the same time, similar to the Commission, the BK has the instrument of sector 
inquires at its disposal (see Art. 32e ARC which resembles Art. 17 Regulation 1/2003), which 
may trigger follow-on CDs. 
Supposedly, the main objective of sector inquiries is to serve as a substitute for the lack of 
information provided by the now abolished notification system. However, concerns are raised 
that they may in fact be used for political or lobbying purposes instead.201 There are only very 
low standards for the initiation of sector inquiries.202 Hence, they might be conducted with 
less objectivity or precision as normally required for enforcement in individual cases.203 
Moreover, it has been criticised that there is a risk that they become “an exercise in gathering 
information to support a preconceived conclusion or achieve a pre-determined goal”.204 At the 
same time, there are little checks on the way sector inquiries are conducted, and no effective 
judicial control of their findings. Hence, chances are that the combination of sector inquiries 
and follow-on CDs may be used to circumvent legal restraints and judicial control in order to 
pursue policy aims different from protecting undistorted competition, i.e. to facilitate 
‘instrumental’ competition law enforcement. 
                                                
199 Accordingly, it is recognized that the Commission must not impose a positive obligation solely to avoid 
future infringements of competition law, Martin Sura, 'Art. 7 VO 1/2003', in Hermann-Josef Bunte (ed.), 
Langen/Bunte Kartellrecht, Kommentar (12 edn., 2 vol. 2014), at para. 6. 
200 Heike Schweitzer, (2012), Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States, p. 2, 3. 
201 Gregory Olsen and Bryony Roy, The New World of Proactive EC Antitrust Enforcement? Sector Inquiries by 
the European Commission, Antitrust 21 vol., 3 iss., 2007, p. 86. 
202 Art. 17 Regulation 1/2003 sets only very low standards: “circumstances [must] suggest that competition may 
be restricted or distorted” but there is no need for prima facie evidence of antitrust infringements. 
203 Gregory Olsen and Bryony Roy, Antitrust (2007), p. 87. 
204 Ibid., at 83, 84. As only the Commission can initiate sector inquiries, they are “solely reflective of the 
Commission’s interests, priorities, and objectives” (p. 84). 
 61 
To a certain extend the CD-practice of the BK seems to confirm these concerns. Especially in 
the energy sector there seems to be a close link between a number of decisions of the BK and 
the corresponding sector inquiry of the Commission:205 Whether one looks at the decisions 
concerning market foreclosure through long-term supply contracts, 206  intransparent and 
discriminating access to gas and electricity networks,207 or the restrictions of secondary 
trading208 – they are all in line with the findings of the Commission’s sector inquiry. At the 
same time, e.g. as discussed above with a view to long-term supply contracts (supra 
D.I.2.a)bb)) or excessive prices for heating current (supra D.I.2.a)aa)), many of the CDs of the 
BK in the energy sector seem to go beyond restoring the competitive process but aim at 
designing the market structure. Hence, these cases are a clear example for the way the 
German NCA uses CDs in order to implement findings of the Commission’s sector inquiries 
and how these decisions might lead to far-reaching, structural remedies outside the realm of 
judicial control. 
                                                
205 See also Heike Schweitzer, (2012), Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States, p. 13; For an 
overview on the practice see also Stephan Manuel Nagel David Broomhall, Ulrich Scholz, The application of 
competition law to the energy sector: An overview and comparison of recent practice by 
the Bundeskartellamt and the EU Commission, Concurrences, 3 iss., 2013. 
206 For the corresponding findings of the Commission see Commission, 10 January 2007, Sector Inquiry (Gas 
and Electricity), at paras. 20, 22, 31 et seq., 46 et seq. and fn. 11. For an overview on the corresponding 
decisions of the BK see Bundeskartellamt, 15 June 2010, , at p. 3 et seq. 
207 For the corresponding aims of the Commission see Commission, 10 January 2007, Sector Inquiry (Gas and 
Electricity), at para. 19. For corresponding decisions of the BK see Bundeskartellamt, 03 June 2009, 
Commitment Decision B10-71/08 – GGEW; Bundeskartellamt, 17 September 2009, Commitment Decision 
B10-74/08 – Stadtwerke Torgau GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 22 April 2010, Commitment Decision B10-42/09 
– Stadtwerke Völklingen Holding GmbH (concerning excessive licence fees of municipal grid companies) 
and e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 22 June 2012, Commitment Decision B10-16/11 – Stadt Pulheim et al., at para. 6; 
Bundeskartellamt, 21 November 2011, Commitment Decision B10-17/11 – Stadt Markkleeberg, at para. 10; 
Bundeskartellamt, 02 December 2013, Commitment Decision B8-180/11-1 – Gemeinde Cölbe/Stadtwerke 
Marburg GmbH, at para. 21; (concerning the procurement of easements in gas and electricity markets).  
208 For the corresponding concerns of the Commission see Commission, 10 January 2007, Sector Inquiry (Gas 
and Electricity), at para. 34. For similar concerns in a sector inquiry of the BK see Bundeskartellamt, 
December 2009, Sector Inquiry (Gas Transmission) B10-7/09, “Kapazitätssituation in den deutschen 
Gasfernleitungsnetzen", pp. 26 et seq. For follow-on CDs of the BK see Bundeskartellamt, 29 October 2010, 
Commitment Decision B10-21-10 – EnBW Vertriebs GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 05 July 2010, Commitment 
Decision B10-45-09 – Erdgas Münster GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 05 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-
44-09 – EWE AG; Bundeskartellamt, 05 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-47-09 – WINGAS GmbH & 
Co KG; Bundeskartellamt, 05 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-10-10 – ENTEGA Vertriebs GmbH & 
Co KG; Bundeskartellamt, 05 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-14-10 – Stadtwerke Hannover AG; 
Bundeskartellamt, 05 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-48-09 – RWE AG; Bundeskartellamt, 05 July 
2010, Commitment Decision B10-20-10 – Köthen Energie GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 05 July 2010, 
Commitment Decision B10-19-10 – Statdwerke Kiel AG; Bundeskartellamt, 05 July 2010, Commitment 
Decision B10-11-10 – SWM Versorgungs GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 19 July 2010, Commitment Decision 
B10-13-10 – Stadtwerke Leipzig GmbH; Bundeskartellamt, 19 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-18-10 
– N-ERGIE AG; Bundeskartellamt, 19 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-12-10 – RheinEnergie AG; 
Bundeskartellamt, 06 October 2010, Commitment Decision B10-22-10 – EnBW Gas GmbH; 
Bundeskartellamt, 06 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-24-10 – Erdgas Südwest GmbH; 
Bundeskartellamt, 06 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-23-10 – EnBW Ostwürttemberg DonauRies 
AG; Bundeskartellamt, 29 July 2010, Commitment Decision B10-25-20 – Stadtwerke Düsseldorf AG. 
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Similarly, in some cases the CDs followed the findings of sector inquiries of the BK.209 
Hence, the concerns raised above can be transferred, with the only difference that it is the BK 
and not the Commission that (centrally) defines policy objectives and priorities.  
On the other hand, some sector inquiries of the BK rather followed CDs of the BK, in order to 
assess whether or not the desired effects on the market can be found, and in how far further 
enforcement action is necessary to achieve certain policy objectives (e.g. market 
liberalisation).210 Hence, sector inquiries might be used to control the effects of a certain CD-
policy. 
At the same time, it is interesting to see that also in Germany some findings of sector inquiries 
did not trigger follow-on (CDs) procedures due to the fact that the proposed solutions of the 
authority were taken into account in the design of new sector specific regulation.211 This 
exemplifies the interplay of competition law and regulation: The BK opts for CDs to react to 
shortcomings of sector specific regulation and to implement the findings of sector inquires. 
Chances are that when competition law pursues regulatory objectives it may easily go beyond 
its legal limits. Moreover, this shows that there is a need to coordinate the enforcement of 
competition law with other legal regimes and also the work of other authorities, such as the 
German regulatory authority, the Bundesnetzagentur (BN). As will be discussed in the next 
section, CDs might have an important role to play in this regard. 
d) Coordinating ‘Shared Regulatory Space’ 
Another strategy of the BK when using CDs seems to be to facilitate the coordination with 
other administrative agencies, especially the German regulatory authority, the 
Bundesnetzagentur (BN). Interagency coordination has been identified as “one of the central 
challenges of modern governance”:212 When authorities ‘share regulatory space’ coordination 
is crucial to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of the evolving 
interdependencies.213 One example of such a ‘shared regulatory space’, where the BN ensures 
compliance with regulatory law while the BK ensures compliance with competition law, is the 
                                                
209 See e.g. the cases concerning the restriction of secondary trading were the CDs of the BK followed its own 
sector inquiry (as well as the inquiry of the Commission) supra fn. 208. 
210 A good example in this regard: Bundeskartellamt, September 2010, Sector Inquiry (Heating Current). 
211 See e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 20 July 2011, Activity Report 2009/2010, BT-Druck. 17/6640, p. 119; Andreas 
Mundt, (2011), Alternative Instrumente der Kartellbehörden p. 5. 
212 Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, Harvard Law Review 125 
vol., 5 iss., March 2012, p. 1134. 
213 For a systematisation of different forms of ‘shared regulatory spaces’ and different coordination instruments 
see ibid., at 1145 et seq., 55 et seq. 
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marketing of easements (see Sec. 46 (5) EnWG). Both agencies aim at a transparent and non-
discriminatory awarding of the corresponding easement rights in order to warrant undistorted 
competition. To coordinate their enforcement, and especially to facilitate compliance with the 
different legal requirements for undertakings, the authorities published a common 
guideline.214 Interestingly, the BK was able to make this originally non-binding guideline 
compulsory for undertakings by way of CDs: The BK made a number of commitments 
binding concerning easement agreements in gas and electricity markets.215 The authority was 
concerned about the procurement procedure of these rights, in particular that municipalities 
did not apply transparent and non-discriminatory standards when awarding easement rights to 
their own undertakings.216 In reaction to the competition concerns of the authority, the 
undertakings (besides other measures217) committed to comply with the corresponding 
guideline of the BK and the BN.218 Coordination of different agencies through joint rule 
making can be beneficial in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability.219 In this 
regard, it is remarkable how the enforcement tool of CDs has been used by the BK to 
implement common standards with the BN. 
e) Substituting Conditional Exemptions 
As mentioned above, it has been observed that the Commission has been using CDs in order 
to pursue own policy objectives by granting conditional exemptions from the competition 
                                                
214 Bundeskartellamt and Bundesnetzagentur, 15 December 2010, Gemeinsamer Leitfaden von Bundeskartellamt 
und Bundesnetzagentur zur Vergabe von Strom- und Gaskonzessionen und zum Wechsel des 
Konzessionsnehmers. 
215 Bundeskartellamt, 18 October 2011, Commitment Decision B10-6/11 – Große Kreisstadt Dinkesbühl; 
Bundeskartellamt, 21 November 2011, Commitment Decision B10-17/11 – Stadt Markkleeberg; 
Bundeskartellamt, 22 June 2012, Commitment Decision B10-16/11 – Stadt Pulheim et al.; Bundeskartellamt, 
02 December 2013, Commitment Decision B8-180/11-1 – Gemeinde Cölbe/Stadtwerke Marburg GmbH. See 
also Bundeskartellamt, 29 May 2013, Activity Report 2011/2012, p. 102. 
216 Bundeskartellamt, 29 May 2013, Activity Report 2011/2012, p. 102. Similar concerns can be found at Union 
level with a view to vertically integrated undertakings, see Commission, 10 January 2007, Sector Inquiry 
(Gas and Electricity), at para. 19. For the relationship between the CDs policy of the BK and the Commission 
see infra D.II.2. 
217 E.g. the obligation to refund excessive concession payments (see e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 22 June 2012, 
Commitment Decision B10-16/11 – Stadt Pulheim et al., at para. 6), and to repeat the procurement 
procedures and to abstain from including certain potentially anticompetitive clauses in the concession 
agreements (see e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 21 November 2011, Commitment Decision B10-17/11 – Stadt 
Markkleeberg, at para. 10). 
218 See e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 02 December 2013, Commitment Decision B8-180/11-1 – Gemeinde 
Cölbe/Stadtwerke Marburg GmbH, at para. 21; see also Bundeskartellamt and Bundesnetzagentur, 15 
December 2010, Leitfaden Vergabe von Strom- und Gaskonzessionen. 
219 Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi, HLR (March 2012), p. 181 et seq. 
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rules (supra A). Accordingly, the question arises in how far a similar CD-policy is pursued by 
the German NCA.  
Besides introducing the instrument of CDs as a tool of competition law enforcement, 
Regulation 1/2003 led to a fundamental change in the framework for applying Art. 81, 82 EC 
(Art. 101, 102 TFEU), especially by replacing the centralised notification and authorisation 
system by an enforcement system based on the direct application of the Articles in their 
entirety. 220  Before the abolition of the notification system by Regulation 1/2003, the 
Commission alone was competent to grant (conditional) authorisations under Art. 81 (3) EC 
(now Art. 101 (3) TFEU).221 For NCAs the situation did not change, since the courts interpret 
Art. 5 Regulation 1/2003 as precluding NCAs from being able to take a decision stating that 
there has been no infringement of competition law.  
NCAs may only decide that there are no grounds for action on their part on the basis that 
(according to the information in their possession) the conditions for prohibition are not met.222 
In Germany a decision that there are no grounds for action can be taken pursuant to Sec. 32c 
ARC, which aims at providing legal certainty to undertakings that are obligated to self-assess 
their conduct. In how far the latter is suitable to substitute the power to decide that there has 
been no infringement is subject to controversy.223 Neither a decision based on Sec. 32c ARC, 
nor CDs of the BK are binding for other authorities (especially not NCAs of other MS) or 
courts.224 Hence, the question arises why the BK should use CDs instead of decisions 
pursuant to Sec. 32c ARC to grant ‘conditional exemptions’. There appear to be two main 
reasons: first, there is no provision explicitly granting the power to the BK to grant a 
conditional decision under Sec. 32c ARC.225 Second, the requirements to take a decision 
under Sec. 32 ARC are stricter compared to Sec. 32b ARC, as the BK has to come to the 
conclusion that based on the available evidence the requirements for a prohibition are not met. 
                                                
220 See Art. 1 (2) Regulation 1/2003. Only in exceptional cases, where the “Community public interest“ requires 
it, Art. 10 Regulation 1/2003, which has never been used so far, replaces the former authorisation system. 
221 See Art. 9 (1) Regulation 17/62. 
222 With a view to Art. 102 TFEU see GC, 3 May 2011, Case C‑375/09, ECR 2011 I-3055 – Tele2 Polska. 
223 Critical towards the view of the Commission that the decision that there are no ground for action suffices e.g. 
Nicolas Petit, 5 October 2011, Chillin'Competition, “Canada Dry” Decisions. 
224 Albrecht Bach, § 32 b GWB, at paras. 23, 24. A provision similar to Art. 16 Regulation 1/2003 concerning 
decisions of NCAs, according to which NCAs and national courts are precluded from taking decisions that 
are “running counter” to CDs of the Commission e.g. by finding an infringement of competition law based on 
the same facts after the issuance of a CD, is missing. 
225 However, in practice there seem to be cases were the BK first mentions concerns about certain conduct of an 
undertaking and later, after the undertaking changed this conduct, issues a decision under Sec. 32c ARC. See 
e.g. Bundeskartellamt, 22 June 2009, Activity Report 2007/2008, at p. 134. 
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Looking at the practice of the BK seems to affirm the hypothesis that one strategy of the 
authority is to use CDs to substitute for the lack of powers to grant conditional non-
infringement decisions. A good example is the already mentioned decision of the BK 
concerning the central marketing of media rights by the League Association in respect of 
matches in the first and second national football division.226 In this decision the BK examined 
in detail the requirements for an exemption according to Art. 101 (3) TFEU and Sec. 2 ARC, 
although several questions were only raised but not finally answered,227 and came to the 
conclusion that the possible efficiencies of the conduct make further interventions of the 
authority superfluous as long as the participation of the consumers is ensured by an 
appropriate marketing model.228 Therefore, the authority and the League Association agreed 
on a detailed marketing concept for the corresponding media rights from the 2013/2014 
season onwards. The commitments were made binding upon the undertaking in exchange for 
the legal certainty that there will be no competition law proceedings with regard to the 
centralised marketing system. Furthermore, this seems to be a way for the BK to implement 
its own competition policy (which is strongly influenced by decisions of the Commission) 
with a view to the design of the market for the procurement of media rights in respect of 
matches in the first and second national football division. 
Another suitable showcase for the similarities of CDs and conditional exemptions is a 
decision of the BK concerning a joint venture between the three mobile phone network 
operators T-Mobile, Vodafone and O2. The BK established that the requirements for an 
exception under Art. 81 (3) EC (Art. 101 (3) TFEU), Sec. 2 ARC might be met as the 
cooperation concerns several newly developing markets and facilitates the quick introduction 
of the new DVB-H technology. The authority emphasised that the decision aims at making 
sure that the cooperation does not eliminate competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question and that the commitments are apt to reduce the negative effects on 
competition to the minimum degree necessary in order to realize the efficiencies.229 As the 
development of the technology in the markets concerned is hard to assess, the authority opted 
for a CD as a quick and flexible instrument to secure the potential efficiency gains of the 
introduction of the DVB-H standard into the market depended on the fact that there are no 
other technologies available that provide for a workable alternative and relativize the 
                                                
226 Bundeskartellamt, 12 January 2012, Commitment Decision B 6-114/10 – Bundesliga. See supra D.I.2.a)cc). 
227 See e.g. Ibid. at paras. 72, 90. 
228 Ibid. at paras. 54 et seq., 89, 91 et seq. 
229 Bundeskartellamt, 29 October 2007, Commitment Decision B 7 – 17/06 – Mobile Broadcasting, at para. 81. 
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efficiency gains of the DVB-H standard. Put more critically, it could be argued that the BK 
supported a certain technology (the DVB-H standard), as it assumed that the technology 
would prevail in the market anyway,230 by granting exceptions under competition law in order 
to quickly achieve certain efficiencies and consumer benefits.  
While this decision strongly interferes with the competitive process, it uses the mechanism of 
reopening the proceeding as a flexible possibility to react to significant changes in the market. 
As will be discussed in the next section, the decision is therefore also a good example for the 
‘experimental’ way the instrument is used in the area of newly evolving and fast developing 
markets. 
f) Experimenting in Fast Developing Markets 
It has been argued that the commitment procedure may be perceived “as a mechanism of 
adjustment through joint learning", which is especially well suited for volatile markets (such 
as high technology sectors), as it facilitates the quick and flexible solution of competition 
concerns and offers the possibility to adapt negotiated remedies to changes in the market.231  
The decision mentioned above concerning the joint venture between the three mobile phone 
network operators T-Mobile, Vodafone and O2 (supra D.I.2.e) can be read as an example of 
such a strategy. In this decision the BK was concerned with negative effects of the joint 
venture, such as the creation of technical market entry barriers and tying of the DVB-H 
standard to other mobile radio services.232 At the same time, the authority recognised potential 
efficiencies of the enterprise, such as facilitating the quick introduction of the new DVB-H 
technology, and thus decided to make commitments binding to address the remaining 
concerns without hampering the potential benefits of the project.233 The BK specified the 
                                                
230 The BK clearly states that there are signs that the DVB-H standard would prevail in the market, ibid., at p. 19. 
231 Yane Svetiev, Settling or Learning Through Commitment Decisions?, p. 3, 13 et seq. 
232 First, the BK assumed that there might be several detrimental effects with a view to the newly emerging retail 
market for mobile broadcasting. The high investment in the joint venture might affect the strategy towards 
other technologies (especially UMTS) and might create incentives to tie other technologies to the DVB-H 
standard. Further, the collectivization of costs of the supply of mobile TV potentially reduces the scope left to 
the individual undertakings to set prices. Additionally, the cooperation regarding the content restricts the 
possibility of a differentiation of content in the retail market. (Bundeskartellamt, 29 October 2007, 
Commitment Decision B 7 – 17/06 – Mobile Broadcasting, at pp. 18, 19). With a view to the market for 
mobile data services, the BK was concerned that TV and video supply via the mobile network might be tied 
to the DVB-H standard and only offered complementary in the future. (ibid., at p. 19). Finally, concerning 
the market for end devices, the cooperation might set incentives to incorporate the DVB-H only into mobile 
telephones but not other devices (e.g. MP3 players or notebooks) in order to foreclose the market and to 
exclude other standards (like the DMB standard) from end devices. (ibid., at p. 19). 
233 The undertakings committed not to tie the acquisition of TV-/Video-services via mobile networks (e.g. 3G) to 
the DVB-H standard (ibid., at p. 20); as far as permissible by media law, the customers of the platform may 
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circumstances under which it will reopen the procedure to facilitate the adaptation of the 
commitments: as a definition of a ‘material change in circumstances’ (Sec. 32b (2) no. 1 
ARC) it included especially the case that other technologies will be ready for the market, 
which allow for the expansion of mobile networks that can be used for broadcasting.234 
Hence, this decision can be characterised as an example of ‘experimental’ enforcement via 
CDs, were the BK supported the quick introduction of a technology in a developing and 
dynamic market, subject to the possibility of reopening the procedure and readjustment of the 
remedies applied in case of new technological developments.  
g) Complementing Merger Control in Joint Venture Cases 
Finally, the commitment procedure mentioned before, concerning the joint venture of T-
Mobile, Vodafone and O2 to create and operate a mobile television-broadcasting platform,235 
can be seen as an example for the ‘convergence’ of antitrust and merger remedies.236  
The project was already cleared under the merger control procedure in August 2007.237 It 
included the joint provision of technical services that are necessary to produce and transmit 
digitalized TV signals under the DVB-H standard and the joint acquisition of programme 
content for mobile TV.238 As the CD was linked to the clearance of a joint venture, which is to 
say that the cooperation was only planned but not yet implemented, it required a forward-
looking assessment of the case. The BK, according to its preliminary assessment, predicted 
several restraints of competition due to the cooperation and, in reaction, made several 
                                                                                                                                                   
choose freely which programmes they purchase and which programmes they sell to end customers ((ibid., at 
pp. 21, 22); the “Electronic Service Guide” will only be operated jointly for basic data (title, start and end 
time, genre, brief description of the show), allowing for competition with a view to additional possibilities of 
presenting digital data, and will also be accessible via end devices that are not mobile telephones (ibid., at p. 
22); DVB-H enabled devices must also be able to contain receivers for other mobile TV standards (e.g. 
DMB); DVB-H reception must be made possible on devices other than mobile phones as well; there will be 
no compulsory combination with mobile phone contracts or pre-paid credits; upon request the platform’s 
specifications for devices must be submitted to the BK (ibid., at pp. 23, 24). 
234 Ibid., at para. 78. The BK further included in the definition of ‘material change in circumstances’ the increase 
in frequencies available for DVB-H, the amount of costs collectivized and hard-core restrictions within the 
joint venture. 
235 Ibid. 
236 With a view to the frequent use of structural remedies in the commitment procedure the Commission found 
that there is a “form of convergence between remedies in antitrust cases and in merger cases”, see 
Commission, 9 July 2014, Ten Years of Antitrust Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003, at para. 188. 
237 Bundeskartellamt, 29 October 2007, Commitment Decision B 7 – 17/06 – Mobile Broadcasting, at p. 4. 
238 Ibid., at pp. 12 et seq. 
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commitments binding that were supposed to avoid the establishment of technical market entry 
barriers and the tying of DVB-H standard to other mobile radio services.239  
While the approach to make (structural) remedies binding based on an ex ante assessment of 
the case generally seems to remain the exception in the infringement procedure, in merger 
cases this method has to be applied, as the decision has to be based on the market structure 
and the expected future developments. In this context, the need for a quick and forward-
looking assessment of the effects of the planned joint venture and potentially necessary 
adaptions of the enterprise may be well served by the use of the commitment procedure.  
This is especially true in Germany, where joint ventures are subject to both the cartel 
prohibition and the merger control. This ‘dual control’ may lead to major uncertainties for the 
joint venture even after completion of the merger control procedure, e.g. as the time limits of 
the merger procedure are not applicable to the assessment of the cartel prohibition and as a 
prohibition decision remains possible even afterwards.240 In this regard, CDs may serve to 
quickly solve remaining concerns with regard to the potential negative effects of the 
formation of the joint venture and to create legal certainty for the undertakings concerned.  
Nevertheless, the more general trend of a ‘convergence’ between antitrust and merger cases, 
and the application of similar underlying principles has been interpreted as a sign for a more 
‘regulatory’ approach towards antitrust enforcement, and criticised on the grounds that the 
“nature of what is to be remedied is essentially different”.241 The fundamental difference 
between the ex ante assessment of merger cases and the ex post perspective in antitrust cases, 
“translates into the different nature of both kinds of proceedings, of the standards applied and 
of the risks involved.”242 
II. Enforcement Strategies of the OFT, the CMA and the Regulators 
Already on first glance one notices the small amount of decisions issued in the UK by the 
OFT, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) that recently replaced the OFT, and the 
Regulators that hold concurrent competition enforcement powers for their respective 
                                                
239 Supra fn. 232, 233. 
240 For further discussion see only Jürgen Lindemann, 'Anhang zu § 1 GWB, Gemeinschaftsunternehmen', in 
Ulrich Loewenheim, Karl M. Meessen, and Alexander Riesenkampff (eds.), Kartellrecht, Kommentar (2 
edn., München 2009), at para. 11. 
241 Damien Gerard, Negotiated remedies in the modernization era: the limits of effectiveness, p. 21. 
242 Ibid. 
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sectors:243 only 8 CDs (compared to 77 of the BK, and 33 of the Commission), and only 24 
IDs (compared to 70 of the BK, and 78 of the Commission) have been issued since the 
authorities have the instrument of CDs at hand.244 The small amount of cases limits the range 
of strategies to be found in the UK when handling CDs. Nevertheless, three types of strategies 
can be identified (2.). However, before analysing the CD-practice in more detail this section 
will focus on the effects of the OFT’s Enforcement Guidance on the scope of application of 
the commitment procedure (1). 
1. Effects of the OFT’s Enforcement Guidance on the Scope of Application of CDs  
The binding guidance on the scope of application of the commitment procedure distinguishes 
the procedural framework in the UK from the procedural design in Germany (and the EU). 
The question arises in how far this difference impacts the practice of the NCAs. How much 
are the authorities in the UK actually restrained by the requirements established in the 
Enforcement Guidance? The difficulty in answering this question is that no information is 
published on (the number of) cases in which these requirements are not met. Furthermore, the 
small amount of CDs issued is no reliable yardstick as there are generally only few decisions 
passed in the UK. Moreover, the ratio of CDs compared to IDs is not very different e.g. from 
Germany (when excluding hardcore cartel conduct): In the UK CDs make up for 80 % and in 
Germany 82 % of the decisions. 
Nevertheless, it can be said that all CDs in the UK explain why it was appropriate to accept 
commitments. 245  Arguably, this enhances the transparency of the procedure, facilitates 
judicial control of the appropriateness of the application of instrument, and, hence, reduces 
the danger of an overuse of consensual competition law enforcement. Furthermore, these 
requirements provide third parties with parameters to exercise control (during the ‘market 
test’) on the suitability of the case for CDs, and force the authorities to justify their choice of 
the enforcement instrument.246 However, much depends on the quality of the reasoning, and 
                                                
243 See for the concurrent powers of the Regulators Sec. 54 and sch. 10 CA98. 
244 The small number of competition cases run in the UK was identified as a general problem by the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2012, Growth, Competition and the Competition Regime, at para. 6.17. 
245 For the OFT, 24 May 2005, Commitment Decision, No. CA98/03/2005 – TV Eye Limited, at paras. 42 et 
seq.; OFT, 1 March 2006, CA98/02/2006, CE/2479/03 – London-wide newspaper distribution, at paras. 32 et 
seq.; OFT, December 2011, Commitment Decision, OFT1395, CE/9388/10 – Private Motor Insurance, at 
paras. 5.3 et seq. Ofgem, 24  May 2012, Commitment Decision, 76/12 – North West Ltd (connection 
charges), at paras. 4.3 et seq.; OFT, 09 September 2014, Commitment Decision, CMA, CE/9496-11 – 
Vehicle service, maintenance and repair platforms in the UK, at paras. 4.5 et seq. 
 246 See e.g. Ofgem, 24  May 2012, Commitment Decision, 76/12 – North West Ltd (connection charges), at 
paras. 412 et seq. and para. 421. 
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in fact looking in some more detail at the arguments brought forward by the authorities shows 
that the effects of the Enforcement Guidance should not be overrated: Often the authorities 
only repeat the requirements and state that they are met without giving arguments or they 
simply refer for reasoning to (or summarise) other parts of the decision.247 At the same time, 
often these issues are also discussed in commitment decisions of the BK or the Commission 
e.g. in reaction to the market test or as part of the proportionality test.248 One exception, 
                                                
247 This is true for the requirements that the competition concerns must be “readily identifiable” (for references 
to other chapters of the decision see OFT, 24 May 2005, Commitment Decision, No. CA98/03/2005 – TV 
Eye Limited, at para. 44; OFT, 1 March 2006, CA98/02/2006, CE/2479/03 – London-wide newspaper 
distribution, at para. 34; Ofgem, October 2005, Commitment Decision – SP Manweb, at para. 7.2, fn. 16; for 
short summaries of the competition concerns see OFT, December 2011, Commitment Decision, OFT1395, 
CE/9388/10 – Private Motor Insurance, at para. 5.6; Ofgem, 24  May 2012, Commitment Decision, 76/12 – 
North West Ltd (connection charges), at para. 4.6); fully addressed by the commitments (OFT, 24 May 2005, 
Commitment Decision, No. CA98/03/2005 – TV Eye Limited, at para. 45; OFT, 1 March 2006, 
CA98/02/2006, CE/2479/03 – London-wide newspaper distribution, at para. 35; OFT, December 2011, 
Commitment Decision, OFT1395, CE/9388/10 – Private Motor Insurance, at para. 5.6; Ofgem, October 
2005, Commitment Decision – SP Manweb, at para. 7.5; only in Ofgem, 24  May 2012, Commitment 
Decision, 76/12 – North West Ltd (connection charges), at para. 4.7-4.9, a short reasoning can be found as to 
why the authority considers the commitments to be fully addressed); that the proposed commitments must be 
capable of being implemented effectively and (if necessary) within a short period of time (ibid., at para. 4.7 
simply states that the requirement is met without any reasoning; OFT, 24 May 2005, Commitment Decision, 
No. CA98/03/2005 – TV Eye Limited, at para. 46; OFT, 1 March 2006, CA98/02/2006, CE/2479/03 – 
London-wide newspaper distribution, at para. 36; Ofgem, October 2005, Commitment Decision – SP 
Manweb, at para. 7.6 refer to the agreed timescale for the implementation; OFT, December 2011, 
Commitment Decision, OFT1395, CE/9388/10 – Private Motor Insurance, at para. 5.6 additionally underlines 
in general terms that the offered modification of the product is easy to conduct); that the conduct must not 
constitute a “hardcore cartel” (see only OFT, 24/04/2005, No. CA/98/03/2005 – TV Eye Limited, at para. 
48; 12/2011, CE/9388/10 – Private Motor Insurers, at para. 5.7); that the conduct must not consist of a 
“serious abuse of a dominant position” (not discussed at all in OFT, 1 March 2006, CA98/02/2006, 
CE/2479/03 – London-wide newspaper distribution and Ofgem, October 2005, Commitment Decision – SP 
Manweb; only stated that the requirement is met in OFT, 24 May 2005, Commitment Decision, No. 
CA98/03/2005 – TV Eye Limited, at para. 48; in Ofgem, 24  May 2012, Commitment Decision, 76/12 – 
North West Ltd (connection charges), at para. 4.16 the regulator simply refers to it’s Notice of intention to 
accepting binding commitments (Ofgem, 23 November 2011, 158/11 – Notice of intention to accept binding 
commitments from Electricity North West Limited ), to reply to a third party that commented on the 
proposed commitments, arguing: „This assessment [of the seriousness of abuse] includes consideration of the 
wider developments in the market. The Notice of intention to accepting binding commitments considered 
these wider developments.“ However, no further explicit reasoning regarding the seriousness of the abuse 
can be found in that notice.). The requirement that compliance with and the effectiveness of any binding 
commitments would not be difficult to discern, is discussed in a number of decisions. The authorities mainly 
argue that the undertakings that suffered from the competition law infringement are in a good position to 
monitor the compliance with the commitments and they refer to reporting obligations opposed up on the 
undertakings that offered the commitments (OFT, 24 May 2005, Commitment Decision, No. CA98/03/2005 
– TV Eye Limited, at para. 50; OFT, 1 March 2006, CA98/02/2006, CE/2479/03 – London-wide newspaper 
distribution, at para. 38, 39; Ofgem, October 2005, Commitment Decision – SP Manweb, at para. 7.6. This 
requirement is not discussed in Ofgem, 24  May 2012, Commitment Decision, 76/12 – North West Ltd 
(connection charges) and OFT, December 2011, Commitment Decision, OFT1395, CE/9388/10 – Private 
Motor Insurance). 
248 While the identification of the competition concerns is generally part of preliminary assessment, the question 
weather or not and how these concerns are addressed by the commitments is discussed as part of the 
proportionality test or in reaction to the market test (See e.g. Commission, 11 October 2007, Commitment 
Decision COMP/B-1/37.966 – Distrigaz, at paras. 17 et seq., 34 et seq.; Commission, 18 June 2012, 
Cimmtment Decision COMP/39.736 – Siemens/Areva, at paras. 31 et seq., para 103; Commission, 12 
December 2012, Commitment Decision COMP/AT.39.847 – E-Books, at paras. 4.2, 4.3, 8, 9.2). 
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however, appears to be the requirement that accepting commitments must not undermine 
deterrence. This is a requirement that is usually not discussed in CDs of the other authorities 
and that is dealt with in the UK with a varying degree of scrutiny.249 
2. Strategies of the Competition Authorities and the Regulators 
Despite the fact that only a very limited amount of decisions has been published in the UK so 
far, three types of strategies of the NCAs and Regulators in the UK can be identified, all of 
which seem to correspond to strategies identified in the practice of the BK: The strategy to 
use CDs to shape market structures (a),250 to substitute conditional exemptions (b),251 and to 
experiment in fast developing markets (c).252 
a) Shaping Market Structures 
As in Germany, the NCAs in the UK seem to have used CDs to change market structures, 
sometimes even in an ‘instrumental’ way, by exceeding the aim of re-establishing compliance 
with infringed competition law and pursuing more far-reaching objectives.  
One recent example is the Western Isles Road Fuels case, which deals with long-term 
exclusive supply contracts between suppliers of road fuels and filling stations.253 In order to 
address the competition concerns of the CMA with a view to Ch. II CA98 the undertaking 
concerned not only committed to alter the contracts in question,254 but additionally committed 
to open up access to its marine terminals for rival wholesalers. As no refineries exist on the 
isle in question all road fuels are transported through these terminals to the market 
concerned.255 In this regard the CMA points out that opting for the commitment procedure 
does not undermine deterrence, since the “quasi-structural”256 commitments that relate to 
access to the marine terminals are likely to have a deterrent effect as they “go beyond 
terminating Certas’ [the undertaking concerned] contractual restrictions of filling stations [… 
                                                
249 Supra C.II.2.c). 
250 See supra D.I.2.a). 
251 See supra D.I.2.e). 
252 See supra D.I.2.f). 
253 CMA, 24 June 2014, Commitment Decision MP-SIP/0034/ – Western Isles Road Fuels. 
254 The undertakings concerned committed to allow filling station to negotiate prices for each individual 
transaction, or limiting exclusivity contracts to a period of two years, or giving filling stations the opportunity 
to terminate contracts with no fixed end-date at any time by giving three months’ notice (p. 16). 
255 CMA, 24 Junde 2014, Commitment Decision MP-SIP/0034/ – Western Isles Road Fuels, at para. 4.1. 
256 The CMA uses the term ‘quasi-structural’ without any clear definition. In fact, the obligation to grant access 
is a behavioural remedy with structural effects. 
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but] also address the specific market structure”, and the “resultant forward-looking benefits 
[…] outweigh any potential loss of deterrence from not reaching an infringement decision”.257 
This already suggests that the ‘quasi-structural’ commitments go beyond the remedies at hand 
in the infringement procedure to address the competition concerns of the case. Yet, the CMA 
(in a footnote) underlined even more clearly that the commitments go beyond the competition 
concerns of the case, as “access to the marine terminals provide for wholesalers to draw ‘oil 
products’ including heating oils – not only road fuels, which are the focus of the CMA’s 
concerns – from the terminals.”258 In sum, the decision seems to aim at altering the market 
structure via ‘quasi-structural’ commitments, which go beyond addressing the competition 
concerns of the case and, hence, exceed possible remedies in an alternative infringement 
procedure. 
Another example for a decision were such (behavioural) remedies with structural effects were 
made binding is the London wide newspaper distribution case concerning exclusive 
distribution agreements between Associated Newspaper Limited (ANL) and the operator of 
the London underground network, a maintenance company of UK’s rail infrastructure, and 
several train operating companies.259 The OFT was concerned that ANL may have abused its 
dominant position on the market for sale and/or distribution of free and/or paid for 
newspapers in the London area by foreclosing the market to new entry due to the combination 
of the long duration of these contracts and the 24 hour exclusivity (despite the fact that ANL 
only distributed newspaper in the morning).260 In reaction, ANL not only committed to waive 
its exclusive rights relating to the afternoon and evening distribution, but also to make 
arrangements for third party access to its distribution racks on commercial and non-
discriminatory terms.261 Different to the Western Isles Road Fuels case, during the ‘market 
test’ the OFT expressly dealt with the danger of making “too interventionist” commitments 
binding that “may well not be proportionate and could even be interpreted as going beyond 
the OFT's powers under the Act in the given circumstances“.262 For this reason the authority 
refused to demand more far-reaching commitments, which would obligate the undertakings 
concerned to re-tender their afternoon/evening distribution slots. Hence, in this case – despite 
                                                
257 CMA, 24 Junde 2014, Commitment Decision MP-SIP/0034/ – Western Isles Road Fuels, at para. 4.6. 
258 Ibid., Fn. 25. 
259 OFT, 1 March 2006, CA98/02/2006, CE/2479/03 – London-wide newspaper distribution. 
260 Ibid., at paras. 19 et seq. 
261 Ibid., at paras. 27 et seq. 
262 Ibid., at para. 67. 
 73 
the use of (behavioural) remedies with structural effects (‘quasi-structural’) – there seems to 
be (at least) a clear intention of staying within the traditional limits of competition law 
enforcement. 
b) Substituting Conditional Exemptions 
As a consequence of the Tele2 Polska decision263 the UK’s NCA (similar to the BK) is 
without the authority to take a decision stating that there has been no infringement of 
competition law, but can only pass decisions that there are no grounds for action on their part, 
on the basis that (according to the information in their possession) the conditions for 
prohibition are not met.264  As in Germany, the question arises whether – despite the 
possibility to issue a decision that there are no grounds for action – the competition authority 
in the UK uses CDs to substitute for the power to grant conditional non-infringement 
decisions as a competition policy tool. A closer look at the practice in the UK seems to affirm 
this hypothesis. 
A clear example is the Private Motor Insurance case.265 The OFT was concerned about an 
information exchange product that enables insurers to access other insurers’ pricing 
information for any risk profile and allows insurers to know in detail what their rivals’ future 
prices will be, to determine detailed structure of their rivals’ pricing strategies, and to adjust 
their own quotation prices. In particular, the fact that the information exchanged included 
highly individualised, commercially sensitive, non-public, and highly disaggregated pricing 
details and was exchanged on a frequent and consistent basis, raised concerns with a view to 
Art. 101 (1) TFEU and Ch. I CA98 (p. 4).  
At the same time, the OFT recognised that information exchange may facilitate market entry 
and benefit consumers – as also the Commission pointed out in its (for other reasons not 
applicable) insurance block exemption regulation – and it could therefore not be ruled out that 
the criteria of Art. 101 (3) TFEU and Sec. 9 CA98 were met (p. 29). However, especially with 
a view to the features of the information exchanged, the OFT was sceptical that the exchange 
was indispensable for potential pro-competitive purposes.266 Exactly these features of the 
                                                
263 GC, 3 May 2011, Case C‑375/09, ECR 2011 I-3055 – Tele2 Polska. 
264 See supra D.I.2.e). 
265 OFT, December 2011, Commitment Decision, OFT1395, CE/9388/10 – Private Motor Insurance. 
266 Ibid., at p. 30: “In the OFT's view the frequent sharing of highly disaggregated, individualised and future data 
in this case is unlikely to be indispensable, especially if they are related to prices. The OFT considers that in 
this case, the sharing of future individualised data can facilitate a common understanding of the market and 
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information were subject to the commitments of the undertakings concerned. They were 
obligated to exchange information only in line with certain principles. According to these 
principles, no access must be granted to individualised future data, but only to anonymous 
data based on an average across at least five insurers (p. 36). According to the original 
definition this included all data that was less than 36 months old. However, during the 
consultation process not only was evidence presented to the OFT that the information 
exchange benefits market entrants (p. 44) but furthermore it was shown that most insurers 
tended to alter their prices on a two to three months basis, and therefore sharing data that was 
more than six months old was highly unlikely to facilitate a collusive outcome (p. 40). In 
consequence, in order not to constrain market entrants, the OFT accepted modifications of the 
commitments in a way that only the sharing of data up to six months old was subject to the 
special requirements concerning the features of the information exchanged (p. 40, 44).  
The decision is a clear example of a CD that resembles a conditional exemption, and shows 
how the OFT is able to use CDs in a way to fine-tune market conduct of undertakings in a 
way it considers best suited to meet the criteria for an efficiency justification.267  
Another decision that seems to be a good example for how CDs are used to implement certain 
visions of which behaviour of undertakings minimizes restraints of competition, while 
maximizing potential efficiencies, is the hotel online booking-decision.268 At the same time, 
this decision can be read as an example for another strategy, which is to use CDs to 
experiment in fast developing markets. 
                                                                                                                                                   
punishment strategies, by providing the coordinating companies with the ability to signal focal points and 
single out deviation or new entry.” 
267 Another decision that was perceived as an example for a substitute of a conditional exemption was OFT, 24 
May 2005, Commitment Decision, No. CA98/03/2005 – TV Eye Limited, see Heike Schweitzer, (2012), 
Commitment Decisions in the EU and in the Member States, p. 15. The decision was concerned with 
agreements between broadcasters to collectively develop and enforce standard terms and conditions 
concerning credit arrangements and payment dates and exchanged price sensitive information (para. 52). The 
OFT accepted that certain efficiencies could be gained through some centralisation (para. 52) and the 
commitments were supposed to retain these efficiencies without the competition concerns regarding the 
current arrangement (para. 57). 
268 OFT, 31 January 2014, Commitment Decision, OFT1514dec – Hotel online booking, at paras 6.53 et seq. 
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c) Experimenting in Fast Developing Markets 
Finally, in the UK as well CDs have been used in contexts of volatile markets as a means to 
‘experiment’ with quick solutions for competition concerns that can be readjusted to changes 
in the market.269 
In the hotel online booking-case, the OFT was concerned with vertical agreements between 
different hotel companies and online travel agents (OTAs), which restricted the ability of the 
latter to offer rooms to consumer for a discounted rate (by minimizing their own margins or 
commissions). These discounting restrictions might infringe Art. 101 (1) TFEU and 
Ch. I CA98 by limiting price competition between OTAs, as well as between OTAs and 
hotels’ own online platforms (intra-brand competition), and by creating barriers to entry of 
new OTAs.270 At the same time, the OFT acknowledged that these restrictions might lead to 
the realisation of efficiencies and therefore raised the issue of “how much discounting 
freedom would be appropriate in the context of the dynamic nature of the market”.271 
Unrestricted freedom to discount hotel accommodation may e.g. reduce the incentives of 
hotels to deal with OTAs and thereby damage inter-brand competition and chilling 
competition in the development of new business models.272 In consequence, the OFT made 
commitments binding that did not allow for unrestricted discounting but allowed granting of 
reductions only to ‘closed groups’ (e.g. in the context of membership or loyalty schemes).273 
Hence, as indicated above, the case can be seen as an example for the way CDs may be used 
to substitute conditional exemptions. 
Furthermore, the CD was implemented in an ‘experimental’ manner. The OFT pointed out 
that “the exact consequences of the introduction of limited price competition through the 
Final Commitments cannot be anticipated with complete certainty” and also that the result of 
the negotiations with the parties is not considered to be “the only possible solution to the 
competition concerns it has identified”.274 Therefore, the OFT emphasised particularly the 
                                                
269 On CDs as a “as a mechanism of adjustment through joint learning" see Yane Svetiev, Settling or Learning 
Through Commitment Decisions?, p. 3, 13 et seq. 
270 OFT, 31 January 2014, Commitment Decision, OFT1514dec – Hotel online booking, at paras. 5.1 et seq. 
271 Ibid., at para. 652, see also paras. 652 and 654 et seq. According tot he OFT the still growing hotel online 
booking sector is especially characterised by frequent introduction of new technology, the development of 
new business models and the complex interaction between various players and distribution channels. 
272 Ibid., at para. 653. For further potential harmful effects of too much pricing freedom see also paras. 6.54 et 
seq. 
273 Ibid., at paras. 6.12 et seq. 
274 Ibid., at paras. 6.57 and 6.64. 
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reduction of the duration of the commitments from three to two years, as a reaction to 
corresponding concerns raised by participants of the market test, as an important step to “be 
able to consider the impact of the Final Commitments in this evolving sector, and any 
unintended consequences, within a shorter time horizon.”275 Furthermore, the OFT underlined 
the role of monitoring and reporting obligations of the parties.276  
In sum, apart from the resemblance to a conditional exemption,277 this decision has a clear 
‘experimental’ character, in that it quickly implements negotiated remedies in a dynamic 
market but foresees control mechanisms, and a short time limit for an evaluation of the effects 
of the chosen measures, as a basis for possible readjustments. 
III. Summary and Discussion 
Commitment procedures are of major importance for competition law enforcement in 
Germany and the UK. Procedural economy and flexibility are the main aims of the 
enforcement tool. Accordingly, one strategy of the German NCA seems to be to use 
infringement procedures and corresponding court proceedings as a role model for follow-on 
commitment procedures, which facilitate a quicker and more consensual implementation of 
remedies across (geographical) markets. This strategy promises a combination of the benefits 
of both types of procedures. Similarly, ‘experimenting’ in dynamic markets that are often 
characterized by a high level of uncertainty, and negotiating commitments that are subject to 
adjustment to changing market environments is another strategy frequently applied in the MS 
analysed here. This approach demonstrates the suitability of the commitment procedure as a 
“policy-learning device”,278 especially as it allows to develop consensual solutions with the 
players active and, arguably, most knowledgeable about the sector. Finally, another 
interesting approach in this context is to use CDs as a tool to coordinate ‘shared regulatory 
space’ (e.g. between competition authorities and regulatory agencies). The flexibility of the 
tool allows for adjustment to practices and policies of other regulators acting in the same 
‘regulatory space’, and therefore to minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of the 
existing interdependencies for the agencies themselves, as well as for the undertakings 
concerned. 
                                                
275 Ibid., at paras. 6.37 et seq., 6.58. 
276 Ibid., at para. 6.59. 
277 Again, this is a case were the authority negotiated prescriptive rather than proscriptive commitments, which 
don’t simply prohibit discounting restrictions but define exactly how these restrictions have to look like. 
278 Yane Svetiev, Settling or Learning Through Commitment Decisions?, p. 1. 
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On the other hand, the study of CDs at national level has shown that the procedural economy 
of the instrument is not as obvious as one might assume. Moreover, the analysis of the 
enforcement strategies of the NCAs revealed that efficiency seems to be an important aim but 
not the only reason for the authorities to opt for CDs. A number of strategies can be 
identified, where other objectives seem to prevail: in some cases, CDs seem to be issued in 
order to reshape market structures or prevent future distortion of competition; in other cases, 
CDs seem to be used to address findings of sector inquiries issued by the Commission or 
NCAs; another strategy of NCAs seem to be to use CDs as a substitute for the power to grant 
conditional exemptions; and finally CDs have been used to complement merger proceedings. 
The main concern that arises with a view to these strategies is the danger of competition law 
stretching beyond its legal limits, and of CDs being (mis-)used for ‘instrumental’ competition 
law enforcement. Some of the cases analysed here suggest that CDs may adopt remedies not 
available under established competition law doctrine to pursue policy aims different from 
protecting and re-establishing the competitive process. 
In sum, NCAs seem to make ample use of the discretion granted by the commitment 
procedure. While some of the strategies applied seem to be worthwhile with a view to 
balancing the aim of procedural economy and the aim of preventing ‘instrumental’ 
competition law enforcement, other strategies suggest that also in the MS some more self-
restraint of the competition authorities is called for. 
The (potential) lack of full ex post judicial control and the (partial) lack of sufficient self-
restrain of NCAs underline the importance of comprehensive ex ante procedural safeguards 
and control mechanisms. Arguably, stricter procedures, or the stricter enforcement of 
procedural safeguards, would prevent some of the potential detrimental effects of CDs 
identified above. For example, providing for a requirement that behavioural remedies have to 
be prioritised over (‘quasi’-)structural remedies might reduce the incentive to make 
‘instrumental’ use of CDs to shape (predetermined) market structures. Similarly, the practice 
to base far-reaching remedies (with structural effects) on a highly controversial theory of 
harm would not be possible, if CDs could not be used in cases were novel or uncertain legal 
issues arise. In fact, the OFT’s guidance on the scope of application of CDs, which is a 
distinctive feature of the UK’s commitment procedure, contains a corresponding requirement. 
However, the study has shown that the effects of the Enforcement Guidance are limited in 
practice. Generally, the guidance seems to enhance the transparency of the procedure, to 
facilitate judicial control, and to enhance the ‘market test’ by forcing the authorities to justify 
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their choice, and by providing parameters for testing the accuracy of the decision. On the 
other hand, looking in some more detail at the reasoning of the authorities to justify their 
decision to opt for the commitment procedure shows that the effects of the guidance should 
not be overrated.  
In sum, the strategies analysed above indicate that a stricter procedure might in fact 
significantly influence the way the instrument is handled to translate the abstract rules on 
competition into specific duties for the undertakings concerned, and substitute for the lack of 




While the academic discussion surrounding the perceived trend towards more ‘consensual 
competition law’ in the EU is usually limited to the Commission’s commitment procedures 
and policies, this work has taken on the task of analysing corresponding developments at 
national level. The comparative study of commitment procedures and policies in Germany 
and the UK revealed that a significant degree of diversity exists.  
Throughout this analysis, the view was taken that strong procedural safeguards are necessary 
to prevent CDs that go beyond the traditional legal-limits of competition law. This claim was 
based, on the one hand, on the fact that judicial review of CDs is limited (potentially also at 
national level), and, on the other hand, on the concept that (ideally) CDs should balance the 
aim of procedural economy with the aim of preventing ‘instrumental’ competition law 
enforcement. Accordingly, it has been argued that stricter (national) procedural frameworks 
are preferable – e.g. excluding cases from the commitment procedure were novel legal issues 
arise, establishing clear rules for the negotiation process that safeguard the ‘voluntary’ nature 
of the commitments, or restricting the content of CDs (e.g. by prioritising behavioural 
remedies).  
Moreover, the analysis of CDs practices of NCAs in Germany and the UK has shown that (at 
least at national level) procedural economy seems to be an important, but not the only driving 
force behind the trend towards more ‘consensual competition law’. Various CD enforcement 
strategies of NCAs have been identified. Some of these approaches reflect the potential of the 
instrument to offer quick and flexible solutions for competition concerns, to facilitate mutual 
learning processes of authorities and undertakings, to coordinate ‘shared regulatory spaces’, 
and to ‘experiment’ with remedies in volatile markets. Other policies – e.g. the use CDs to 
shape market structures, to prevent future harm, to substitute conditional exemptions, or to 
complement merger proceedings – hint at additional reasons for the widespread use of CDs. 
Some of these strategies raise concerns that the tool might be misused to stretch competition 
law beyond its legal limits, and pursue policy aims ulterior to the protection of the 
competitive process. These concerns underline the need for sufficient procedural safeguards, 
as complements to administrative self-restrained and comprehensive judicial control. 
The scope of this study is limited and, hence, leaves ample room for future research: 
First of all, the study is confined to analyse 2 out of 28 MS. Hence, a follow-on study could 
analyse commitment procedures and policies of NCAs in other jurisdictions to broaden the 
perspective, and test in how far the findings of this thesis can be generalized. 
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Second, this study focuses on the developments at national level and does not provide for an 
in-depth analysis of the Commission’s commitment procedures and policies. The experiments 
with different procedural designs and policies at national level, which were illustrated and 
discussed here, might have much to add to the on-going discussion surrounding the 
Commission’s practice. While some potential improvements may have been hinted at in the 
course of this inquiry, a more comprehensive follow-up study seems to be promising that 
analyses in detail what there is to be learned for the Commission from the experiences made 
at national level.  
Third, the practices of the Commission and NCAs in the federal structure of the EU 
enforcement regime do not exist independently side-by-side but are in many ways linked and 
interrelated. While some links or similarities have revealed during this study, these 
relationships have not been analysed systematically. A comprehensive examination of these 
links and relationships might help to deepen the understanding of the functioning of the 
commitment procedure, and potential advantages and disadvantages of ‘consensual 
enforcement tools’ in the multilevel competition law enforcement system of the EU. 
Fourth, the trend towards ‘consensual competition law’ analysed here could be seen as part of 
the wider debate surrounding the so-called ‘New Modes of Governance’ (NMG), which 
emerged as part of the internal market programme of the EU. As Micklitz pointed out, 
European governance has “yielded new processes of law-making, new regulatory instruments, 
and new enforcement mechanisms, and it is going to change the substance of the (private) law 
itself”.279 Could it be that the developments discussed here with a view to the instrument of 
commitment procedures are part of the changes in the overall governance structure in the EU? 
Could it be that similar concerns arise – e.g. the implementation of policy programmes via 
‘instrumental’ competition law enforcement; excluding political institutions like the 
parliament from the ‘law making process’, and the courts from its enforcement and 
interpretation; and changing the law via bilateral negotiations rather than controversies in an 
open forum?280 Could it be that similar solutions are called for?281 
                                                
279 Hans-W Micklitz, The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—The Transformation of European 
Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation, Yearbook of European Law, 
28 vol., 1 iss., 2009, p. 18. 
280  With a view to EU governance, Micklitz raised the question of “what remains of law and the rule of law”, 
when they are squashed between economization and politicization and identified three major changes of the 
concept of law: (1) Legal rules are increasingly becoming policy programmes, (2) law-making is no longer 
the subject to political controversy in an open forum, (3) law enforcement is moving away from courts to 
public bodies that seek soft solutions (de-judicialization). Ibid., at 18, 19. See also Mark Dawson, 'New 
Modes of Governance', in A. Södersten D. Paterson (ed.), Blackwell Companion to European and 
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Moreover, a potential counterargument against the position taken in this study could be that a 
stricter procedural design would jeopardize the benefits of the instrument of CDs, especially 
procedural economy and flexibility (supra C.IX). However, placing the tool of commitment 
procedures into the debate surrounding NMG might help to understand the link between CDs 
and ‘the law’ as a complementary relationship: Possibly, ‘law’ could be perceived not as an 
external element but a means to improve participation, credibility, and safeguard rights of 
(excluded) participants, while, on the other hand, CDs may improve ‘the law’ to be less static 
and more responsive to rapidly changing and complex political and economic realities.282  
Finally, fifth, some commentators that analysed the CDs practice of the Commission 
identified a paradigm shift towards more ‘regulatory’ antitrust enforcement.283 Arguably, the 
strategies of NCAs discovered here can be seen as part of a similar paradigm shift at national 
level.284 Hence, the question arises in how far the NCAs choices of enforcement tools have 
consequences for the substance of the law applied.285  
In the European tradition, competition law is perceived as a justiciable, rule-based regime that 
constraints discretionary state intervention and aims at the realisation of the common market, 
as well as the protection of the undistorted and decentralised interaction of undertakings based 
on individual economic freedoms. It is characterized by the trust in the contribution of this 
                                                                                                                                                   
International Law (2014 (forthcoming)), p. 6, 7, who gives three parameters for a negative definition of 
NMG – NMG are in contrast to the traditional method of law making by (1) the creation of relatively uniform 
legal standards, (2) the dual legitimation of EU law through central political institutions like the Council and 
the European Parliament, and (3) the hierarchical application of binding rules within the MS. Doesn’t the 
current CDs practice conflict with these principles? 
281 Micklitz e.g. argues that there is a problem of democratic legitimacy and therefore the question arises, 
whether a normative frame is needed in order to ensure basic procedural requirements, such as transparency, 
accountability and participation, and safeguard their enforceability via individual an/or collective rights.281  
282 On the complementary relation between law and NMG see Mark Dawson, New Modes of Governance, p. 9, 
10. 
283 Damien Gerard, Negotiated remedies in the modernization era: the limits of effectiveness, p. 3, 18 et seq.; 
Niamh Dunne, JCLE (2014), p. 13 et seq. 
284 Niamh Dunne, JCLE (2014), p. 16 et seq., recently used five parameters – relating to the design of the 
instrument as such as well as its application – to measure this trend in the Commissions CDs practice, 
according to which ‘regulatory antitrust’ (1) is administrative-technocratic (rather than adversarial-judicial), 
(2.) enforces the competition rules ex ante (rather than ex post), (3) relies frequently on positive obligations 
(and is therefore prescriptive rather than proscriptive), (4) uses static remedies (instead of relying on the 
dynamic market process), and (5) aims at achieving a perceived ‘optimal’ market outcome (rather than 
preventing anticompetitive conduct). 
285 The power to change the substance of the law applied via ‘consensual competition law enforcement’ triggers 
concerns with a view to the legitimacy of the decision, the principle of separation of powers and the values 
embodied in the rule of law, ibid., at 36 et seq. 
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organized but decentralized system to the overall good.286 Therefore, the essential question to 
ask is how to protect this important European heritage while harnessing the potential benefits 
of a more ‘consensual competition law’. 
  
                                                
286 See for the debate on the goals and interpretation of competition rules in historical context Heike Schweitzer 
and Kiran Klaus Patel, 'EU Competition Law in Historical Context, Continuity and Change', in Heike 
Schweitzer and Kiran Klaus Patel (eds.), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law (Oxford 2012), 




The following tables summarize the CDs and IDs issued in Germany and the UK since the 
introduction of the commitment procedure (01 May 2004 in the UK and 01 July 2005 in 
Germany). They are based on the ‘CA98 Public Register – decisions’287 (UK) and the 
Bundeskartellamt’s online database of decisions288 (Germany). The column ‘Type’ refers to 
the legal basis of the decision. 101/102 refer to Art. 101/102 TFEU (and the former Art. 81/82 
EC), and ‘national equivalent(s)’ refer correspondingly to Ch. I, II CA98 (UK) and 
Sec. 1 et seq., 19 et seq. ARC (Germany). The column ‘Initiation’ refers to the first reported 
date of the corresponding procedure (e.g. the complaint). The column ‘Duration’ gives an 
estimate of the number of days past between the initiation and the issuance of the decision 
(excluding cases concerning ‘hardcore cartels’, which are outside the scope of application of 
CDs).289 The column ‘Remedy’ refers to the outcome of the decision and differentiates 
behavioural, ‘quasi-structural’290, and structural (which were not used) remedies, as well as 
fines. 
 
                                                
287 Available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-
act-and-cartels/ca98/decisions/?Order=Date (last accessed 07/09/2014). 
288 Available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SiteGlobals/Forms/Suche/Entscheidungssuche_Formular.html?nn=3590938
&docId=4116850 (last accessed 07/09/2014). 
289 These numbers entail a certain degree of uncertainty e.g. as in some procedures only the month or the year the 
procedure started was reported. 
290 I.e. behavioural remedies that entail the obligation to grant access and therefore have a structural effect. Other 
behavioural remedies might have structural effects as well, but for the sake of clarity the behavioural 
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